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JUDICIAL AND REGULATORY DECISIONS
SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY OF FOREIGN GOVERNMENT-OWNED
AIRLINES
THE right of an airline owned by a foreign government to claim sover-
eign immunity from uit was raised in Adatto v. United States of Ven-
ezuela.' Linea Aeropostal Venezolana accepted Christmas merchandise from
Louis Adatto, an American citizen, for rush delivery to Caracas, Venezuela.
Adatto alleged that the goods were delayed until after Christmas, result-
ing in the loss of the entire sale price of the merchandise. Linea Aeropostal
Venezolana, or L. A. V., is a "corporation" having no privately owned stock
or shares of any type, and whose officers are all ministers of the Venezuelan
government. Adatto brought two suits. One, directly against L. A. V., went
to trial on the merits, and the defendant did not even claim to be entitled
to sovereign immunity. In the other suit, which was against the United
States of Venezuela, the defendant did not appear, but claimed sovereign
immunity through a brief filed as amicus curiae. The district court dis-
missed the latter suit for lack of jurisdiction, because of sovereign im-
munity, and the Second Circuit affirmed. 2
Rules governing sovereign immunity of government owned business
enterprises in general have become fairly well clarified. The precise effect
of these rules when applied to government owned airlines has not yet been
discussed by the courts, but it appears that cases involving government
owned airlines should be treated like the other cases. In general, a govern-
ment or a governmental agency is entitled to immunity,3 while a separate
corporation owned in part or entirely by the government is not,4 as the
following discussion will show.
The doctrine of sovereign immunity deprives the courts of jurisdiction
over a suit brought directly against a foreign government 5 or involving
property owned directly by a foreign government.6 A suit in which the
foreign sovereign is not named as defendant may nevertheless be barred
if the foreign state is a necessary party, as where the foreign state is one
of the claimants to the funds involved in the suit, 7 or where a state owns
1 181 F. 2d 501 (2d Cir. 1950).
2 The Second Circuit relied on Puente v. Spanish National State, 116 F. 2d 43
(2d Cir. 1940), cert. denied 314 U.S. 627 (1941), in its memorandum opinion
affirming the district court.
a The Exchange, 7 Cranch 116 (U.S. 1812); Ex Parte Republic of Peru, 318
U.S. 578 (1943); Berizzi Brothers Company v. S.S. Pesaro, 271 U.S. 562 (1926).
4 United States v. Deutsches Kalisyndikat Gesellsehaft et al., 31 F. 2d 199
(S. D. N. Y. 1929); Molina v. Comision Reguladora del Mercado de Henequen, 91
N. J. L. 382, 103 Atl. 397 (1918); Plesch et al. v. Banque Nationale de la Repub-
lique d'Haiti, 237 App. Div. 224, 77 N. Y. S. 2d 43 (1st Dept. 1948); JEssuP, A
MODERN LAW OF NATIONS-AN INTRODUCTION 20-21 (1948).
5 Puente v. Spanish National State, 116 F. 2d 43 (2d Cir. 1940), cert. denied
314 U.S. 627 (1941) ; Sullivan v. State of Sao Paulo, 122 F. 2d 355 (2d Cir. 1941) ;
Oliver American Trading Company, Inc. v. Government of the United States of
Mexico et al., 5 F. 2d 659 (2d Cir. 1924), cert. denied 267 U.S. 596 (1925).
6 The Exchange, 7 Cranch 116 (U.S. 1812) ; Berizzi Brothers Company v. S.S.
Pesaro, 271 U.S. 562 (1926).
7 Lamont v. Travelers Insurance Company, 281 N. Y. 362, 24 N. E. 2d 81
(1939); Gallopin v. Winsor et al., 234 App. Div. 601, 251 N. Y. S. 448 (1931);
Ezra v. Lamont et al., 149 Misc. 912, 268 N. Y. S. 222 (Sup. Ct. N. Y. County,
1933), aff'd Mem. 241 App. Div. 805, 271 N. Y. S. 951 (1934), aff'd Mem. 25 N. Y.
635, 193 N. E. 421 (1934). But cf. Federal Motorship Corporation v. Johnsdn and
Higgins, 77 N. Y. S. 2d 52 (Sup. Ct. N. Y. County 1948).
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first mortgage bonds and a foreclosure suit is brought by second mort-
gagees. s
The subject matter of the suit does not seem to be controlling, because
the courts apply the same rules in a wide variety of cases. Sovereign im-
munity exists whether the suit is in rem 9 or in personam.' 0 The principles
apply equally in a suit against a state owned railroad,1 ' a state liquor
monopoly,' 2 a cotton business, 18 or the ownership of mortgage bonds. 14
Government owned ships 15 and tobacco warehouses 16 cannot be sued suc-
cessfully. It is not relevant whether the organization seeking immunity is
carrying on an activity usually thought of as governmental; it is enough
that the foreign government saw fit to engage in that activity.' 7 Thus it
is clear that the court was correct in holding that the government of Ven-
ezuela cannot be subject to suit for acts done by a commercial airline
owned by it.
The rules of sovereign immunity making a corporation subject to suit
and a government exempt seem to be applied equally in contract and tort
suits.' 8 The plaintiff's brief in Adatto v. United States of Venezuela quotes
some language of Mr. Justice Brandeis in Lynch v. United States, which,
taken out of its context, appears to be to the contrary. "When the United
States enters into contract relations, its rights and duties therein are gov-
erned generally by the law applicable to contracts between private indi-
viduals."' 19 The next page of the same opinion makes it clear that Justice
Brandeis was not talking about sovereign immunity. "Contracts between
individuals or corporations are impaired within the meaning of the Consti-
tution whenever the right to enforce them by legal process is taken away
or materially lessened. A different rule prevails in respect to contracts of
sovereigns." In the Lynch case, plaintiffs sued the United States on war
risk insurance contracts with the government, and the defense was that
Congress had repudiated the contracts, by repealing legislation. The opinion
8 Cunningham v. Macon and Brunswick Railroad Company, 109 U.S. 446
(1883).
9 The Exchange, 7 Cranch 116 (U.S. 1812) ; Berizzi Brothers Company v. S.S.
Pesaro, 271 .U.S. 562 (1926); The Carlo Poma, 259 Fed. 369 (2d Cir. 1919).
10 Murray v. Wilson Distilling Co., 213 U.S. 151 (1909) ; Puente v. Spanish
National State, 116 F. 2d 43 (2d Cir. 1940), cert. denied 314 U.S. 627 (1941) ; Oli-
ver American Trading Company. Inc. v. Government of the United States of Mex-
ico et al., 5 F. 2d 659 (2d Cir. 1924).
1 Oliver American Trading Company, Inc. v. Government of the United
States of Mexico et al., supra note 10; Ballaine v. Alaska Northern Railway Co.,
259 Fed. 183 (9th Cir. 1919); Bradford v. Director General of the Railroads of
Mexico, 278 S. W. 251 (Tex. Civ. App. 1925).12 Murray v. Wilson Distilling Co., 213 U.S.' 151 (1909).
Is Fields v. Predionica i Tkanica A.D., 263 App. Div. 155, 31 N. Y. S. 2d 739
(1941).
14 Cunningham v. Macon and Brunswick Railroad Co., 109 U.S. 446 (1883).
1r The Exchange, 7 Cranch 116 (U.S. 1812) ; Ex Parte Republic of Peru, 318
U.S. 578 (1943); Berizzi Brothers Company v. S.S. Pesaro, 271 U.S. 562 (1926).
But e. The Beaton Park, 65 F. Supp. 211 (W. D. Wash., 1946) (ship possessed by
a corporation, not the government, held not entitled to immunity).
16 French Republic v. Board of Supervisors, 200 Ky. 18, 252 S. W. 124 (1923).
17 Oliver American Trading Company, Inc. v. Government of the United
States of Mexico et al., 5 F. 2d 659 (2d Cir. 1924); Ballaine v. "Alaska Northern
Railway Company, 259 Fed. 183 (9th Cir. 1919); F. W. Stone Engineering Co. v.
Petroleos Mexicanos of Mexico, D. F., 352 Pa. 12, 42 A. 2d 57 (1945).
18 E.g., Murray v. Wilson Distilling Co., 213 U.S. 151 (1909) (contract);
Fields v. Predionica i Tkanica A.D., 263 App. Div. 155, 31 N. Y. S. 2d 739 (1941)
(contract); The Maipo, 252 Fed. 627 (S. D. N. Y. 1918) (tort). The sole case
holding that there is a difference in result, depending on whether the suit is con-
tract or tort, is The Charkeih, L. R. 4 A and E 59 (1873), overruled by The Parle-
ment Belge, 5 P. D. 197 (1880).
19 Lynch v. U.S., 292 U.S. 571, 579 (1934).
JUDICIAL
makes it clear that, while Congress' attempt to make the plaintiff's con-
tracts with the government void was not successful, Congress could have
taken away the plaintiff's right to sue on those contracts, because sovereign
immunity protects the government from suits on its contracts unless it
waives that immunity.
20
Our courts have no power to try a foreign sovereign, because of rules of
international law. The Exchange 21 explains that international customs and
understandings show that by permitting a sovereign to enter our country or
to send his property into our territory, we impliedly grant that sovereign and
its property immunity from our laws. The courts observe that to fail to rec-
ognize that immunity could cause serious foreign policy repercussions, as it
would be a violation of faith, could embarrass our Executive Department in
its foreign relations, and could make it harder for our government to claim
immunity for its enterprises.2 2 Furthermore, a wronged claimant may have
a remedy through diplomacy, even though our courts cannot hear his case. 23
Government Corporation Poses New Problems
In the case of a corporation owned by or connected with a foreign sover-
eign, new issues arise. A corporation is not entitled to sovereign immunity,
even though a foreign government owns a part 24 or all 25 of its stock. On
the other hand, sovereign immunity may protect a corporation that is so
closely connected with a government as to be an agency of that govern-
ment.26 Sovereign immunity is generally held not to exist where a separate
corporate entity is set up, so that the property is not owned by the govern-
ment in its own name and the corporation is free to contract in its own
name.2 7 Examples of immune enterprises may be found in cases involving
government owned railroads; the courts look to see whether the railroad has
outstanding stock, whether government appropriations pay operating ex-
20 "The contracts between a Nation and an individual are only binding on the
conscience of the sovereign and have no pretensions to compulsive force. They
confer no right of action independent of the sovereign will." Ibid., quoting Hamil-
ton, THE FEDERALIST, No. 81.
21 7 Cranch 116 (U.S. 1812).
22 The Exchange, 7 Cranch 116 (U.S. 1812) ; 'Republic of Mexico v. Hoffman,
324 U.S. 30 (1945) ; The Maipo, 252 Fed. 627 (S. D. N. Y. 1918) ; Note, 40 COLUM-
BIA L. REV. 453 (1940). It has even been suggested that a failure to grant sover-
eign immunity could be a cause of war. The Maipo, supra, quoted with approval
in The Pesaro, 13 F. 2d 468 (S. D. N. Y. 1926), aff'dBerizzi Brothers Company v.
S.S. Pesaro, 271 U.S. 562 (1926).
22 Banque de France v. Equitable Trust Company of New York, 33 F. 2d 202
(S. D. N. Y. 1929); Hannes v. Kingdom of Roumania Monopolies Institute, 6
N. Y. S. 2d 960 (Sup. Ct. N. Y. County 1938) ; 6 MOORE, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL
LAw §970 (1906).
24 Sloan Shipyards Corporations et al. v. United States Shipping Board
Emergency Fleet Corporation and the United States, 258 U.S. 549 (1922) ; Molina
v. Comision Reguladora del Mercado de Henequen, 91 N. J. L. 382, 103 A. 397
(1918); accord, Coale v. Societe Co-op Suisse des Charbons Basle et al., 21 F. 2d
180 (S. D. N. Y. 1921) (corporation whose stock was owned by private individ-
uals, but which had some of its directors appointed by Swiss Government held not
entitled to sovereign immunity).
25 United States v. Deutsches Kalisyndikat Gesellschaft et al.,- 31 F. 2d 199
(S. D. N. Y. 1929); Molina v. Comision Reguladora del Mercado de Henequen, su-
pra, note 12; Plesch et al. v. Banque Nationale de la Republique d'Haiti, 273 App.
Div. 224, 77 N. Y. S. 2d 43 (1st Dept. 1948).
26 Oliver American Trading Company, Inc. v. Government of the United
States of Mexico et al., 5 F. 2d 659 (2d Cir. 1924); Ballaine v. Alaska Northern
Railway Company, 259 Fed. 183 (9th Cir. 1919) (this case involved a U.S. corpo-
ration, but the tests to be applied seem to be the same as those for a corporation
owned by a foreign government).
27 See footnote 22, above.
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penses, and whether the income is a part of the national revenues. 28 It ap-
pears, then, that L.A.V. has no sovereign immunity, so Adatto's suit against
it correctly went to trial on the merits.
Cases close to the borderline between a corporation whose stock is owned
by a government, which is not entitled to immunity, and an agency of the
government, entitled to immunity, are sometimes hard to distinguish. When
the United States bought all the stock in an Alaskan railway and operated
the line to develop an area, the railroad was held to be merely an agency of
the government, and hence was entitled to immunity. 29 On the other hand,
when Haiti bought all the shares of a bank, and added to the activities of the
bank the duty of being a fiscal agent for the government, the court held that
the bank had no sovereign immunity." °
While the distinction between a government corporation and a govern-
ment has been criticized,8 ' an examination of the policy reasons considered
by the courts will show that this distinction is sensible. When a corporation
is formed, and operates in its own name rather than in the name of its gov-
ernment, this indicates that the enterprise is intended to be separated from
the government. The state is not a necessary party when its corporation is
sued, any more than any stockholder is a necessary party when any corpora-
tion is sued. 32 The law of the foreign state which owns the corporation may,
if examined, be seen to deny immunity to that corporation. 3
*Diplomatic Assistance for Tort Claims
Our State Department draws a distinction between contract and tort
claims, in deciding whether to lend its aid to an American citizen trying to
collect money from a foreign government through diplomatic channels. The
State Department will not lend its aid in contract claims, as it reasons that
one who contracts with a foreign government assumes the risk that the gov-
ernment will deal fairly with him, but the department will lend its aid to the
victim of a tort.34 Representing a claim through diplomacy appears to be of
value only where the courts can give the claimant no aid, so the relevancy of
the tort or contract nature of the claim here is not inconsistent with the
irrelevancy of the nature of the claim when deciding questions of sovereign
immunity from the courts' jurisdiction.
28 Mason v. Intercolonial Railway of Canada, 197 Mass. 349, 83 N. E. 876
(1908); accord, Oliver American Trading Company, Inc. v. Government of the
United States of Mexico et al., 5 F. 2d 659 (2d Cir. 1924) ; Bradford v. Director
General of the Railroads of Mexico, 278 S. W. 251 (Tex. Civ. App. 1925). These
railroad cases were decided on the issue of their connection with their govern-
ments, not on any question relating to the location of the railroads in or out of the
United States, so their reasoning should be applicable to cases involving airlines.
29 Ballaine v. Alaska Northern Railway Company, 259. Fed. 183 (9th Cir.
1919).
30 Plesch et al. v. Banque Nationale de la Republic d'Haiti, 273 App. Div. 224,
77 N. Y. S. 2d 43 (1st Dept. 1948).
31 Fensterwald, Sovereign Immunity and Soviet State Trading, 63 HARVARD
L. REV. 614 (1950).
32 Sloan Shipyards Corporation et al. v. United States Shipping Board
Emergency Fleet Corporation and the United States, 258 U.S. 549 (1922) ; Molina
v. Comision Reguladora del Mercado de Henequen, 91 N. J. L. 382, 103 Atl 397
(1918) ; United States v. Deutsches Kalisyndikat Gesellschaft et al., 31 F. 2d 199
(S. D. N. Y. 1929).
38 United States v. Deutsches Kalisyndikat Gesellsehaft et al., supra note 32.
84 2 HYDE, INTERNATIONAL LAW, CHIEFLY AS INTERPRETED AND APPLIED BY
THE UNITED STATES 890 (2d Rev. Ed. 1945).
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Procedure Before United States Courts
The procedure for presenting a claim of sovereign immunity in United
States Courts, and the role that the State Department plays in court deci-
sions, are decisive in many cases. Ex Parte Muir 35 stated the rule for the
federal courts, holding that the claim may be presented by an appearance
by the foreign sovereign or its accredited representative, or by a suggestion
of our State Department, presented through the Attorney General. The fed-
eral cases since the Muir opinion follow it in holding the Secretary of State's
"suggestion" to be binding,3 6 but a suggestion by an ambassador to be not
binding, even though forwarded by the Secretary of State.37 A suggestion
by an ambassador may be properly considered by the court, but it is not
binding, as is the State Department's action.3 8 An appearance by a corpo-
ration claiming sovereign immunity does not satisfy the requirement of
an appearance by a foreign sovereign or its ambassador.3 9 Where it is
quite clear that sovereign immunity exists, as where the subject of the
litigation is in the direct possession of the foreign government, the court
can hold that it has no jurisdiction even without a recommendation from
the Secretary of State or an appearance by the foreign sovereign, accord-
ing to the rule of Puente v. Spanish National State,40 because the court
does not have to render a judgment that it knows will be void.
Some state courts are not as strict as the federal courts in their hold-
ings on how a claim of immunity should bd presented. The testimony of
a railway agent was held to be sufficient to show that the railroad was
entitled to sovereign immunity, 41 and a brief filed by, an attorney as amicus
curiae may establish such a claim. 42 While the courts of New York can
seek the aid of the State Department,43 the Department's recommendation
is not binding on them, 44 and they will consider a claim of immunity no
matter how it is presented. 45
Perhaps the strongest argument that could be made in the plaintiff's
favor in Adatto v. United States of Venezuela is that the procedure fol-
lowed, filing an amicus curiae brief, was inadequate to present the claim of
sovereign immunity. The Puente case, on which the second circuit relied
in sustaining the dismissal of Adatto's suit, sanctioned a departure from
the Muir rule only where the defendant's right to immunity was clear.
Plaintiff's attorney in his brief emphasizes the argument that the peculiar
nature of the business involved, operating a commercial airline, makes this
35 254 U.S. 522 (1921) ; Note, 26 ILL. L. REV. 215 (1932).
36 Sullivan v. State of Sao Paulo, 122 F. 2d 355 (2d Cir. 1941) ; Isbrandtsen
Co., Inc. v. Netherlands East Indies Government et al., 75 F. Supp. 48 (S. D.
N. Y., 1947); The Beaton Park, 65 F. Supp. 211 (W. D. Wash., 1946).
37 The Secundus, 15 F. 2d 713 (E. D. N. Y., 1926).
38 Compania Espanola v. The Navemar, 303 U.S. 68 (1938).
39 Kunglig Jarnvagsstyrelsen v. Dexter and Carpenter, Inc., 32 F. 2d 195
(1929).
40 Sullivan v. State of Sao Paulo, 122 F. 2d 355 (2d Cir. 1941).
41 Bradford v. Director General of the Railroads of Mexico, 278 S. W. 251
(Tex. Civ. App. 1925).
42 Mason v. Intercolonial Railway of Canada, 197 Mass. 349, 83 N. E. 876
(1908).
43 Russian Socialist Federated Soviet Government v. Cibrario et al., 198 App.
Div. 869, 191 N. Y. S. 543.
44 The Lonsdal Shop, Inc. v. Bibily et al., 126 Misc. 445, 213 N. Y. S. 170
(Mun. Ct. N. Y. 1925). Contra, F. W. Stone Engineering Co. v. Petroleos Mexi-
canos of Mexico, D. F., 352 Pa. 12, 42 A. 2d 57 (1945).
45 Fields v. Predionica i TkanicaA.D., 263 App. Div. 155, 31 N. Y. S. 2d 739
(1941); De Simone v. Transportes Maritimos da Estado, 199 App. Div. 602, 191
N. Y. S. 864 (1922).
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a situation where traditional rules of sovereign immunity should not be
applied. Because the precise question presented had not been passed on by
the courts previously, plaintiff might argue that this is a place for the de-
clared policy 46 that courts should not expand sovereign immunity, a subject
profoundly affecting our foreign relations, without the aid of the State
Department. It is believed, however, that a suit brought against a foreign
sovereign in its own name is never successful, whatever the activity that
sovereign was engaged in, so the fact that air transportation was involved
should raise no serious questions requiring a departure from the Puente
procedure.
The C.A.B. has stated that the Adatto case raises no new problems of
sovereign immunity. 47 Nothing in our statutes, regulations, permits or
treaties seems to contradict this. The permit issued to L.A.V. was typical;
it contained a provision requiring the carrier to accept the Civil Aeronau-
tics Act and the regulations under that act. 48 The Civil Aeronautics Act
provides that permits mayi be issued to foreign airlines willing to conform
to the Act.49 but the Act itself does not cover the problem of jurisdiction
in a civil suit, although it does provide for jurisdiction for violations of the
Act. 50 Our treaties and conventions do not cover this problem. 51 As we saw
above, the subject matter of the suit is not relevant to the question of sov-
ereign immunity.
Plaintiffs in Adatto's place are in no worse a position than anyone
else who claims to have been wronged by a foreign sovereign. Foreign
airlines such as L.A.V. have not tried to claim immunity when sued in'their
own names, even where, as in the case of L.A.V., an argument that there
is no separate corporation seems possible. It is submitted that, because
failing to enforce the traditional international laws on sovereign immunity
could result in serious foreign policy repercussions, it is imperative for our
courts to continue to grant sovereign immunity according to precedent.
40 Republic of Mexico v. Hoffman, 324 U.S. 30 (1945).
47 The C.A.B.'s position was stated in a letter to Senator Johnson on June 20,
1950.
48 C.A.B. Permit No. 2281 (1946).
49 CIVIL AERONAUTICS ACT §402(b), 52 STAT. 991 (1938), 49 U.S.C. §482(b)
(1951).
50 CIVIL AERONAUTICS ACT §§903, 1007, 52 STAT. 1017 (1938), 49 U.S.C. §§623,
647 (1951). The definitions in this act would make L.A.V. a civil aircraft, for the
purposes of this act.§1 (14). "Civil aircraft" means any aircraft other than a public aircraft.§1(30). "Public aircraft" means an aircraft used exclusively in the service
of any government or any political subdivision thereof, including the government
of any State, Territory, or Possession of the United States, or the District of
Columbia, but not including any government-owned aircraft engaged in carrying
persons or property for commercial purposes. 52 STAT. 997 (1938), 49 U.S.C.
§401 (1951).
51 The Warsaw Convention of 1929, dealing with civil liability of foreign air-
craft, was'ratified by the United States in 1934. 49 STAT. (pt. 2) 3000 (1934),
U.S. Treaty Series No. 867. The United States expressly excluded Article 2(1)
of the convention, the article making aircraft owned by states subject to the terms
of the convention.
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AIRLINE LABOR POLICY, THE STEPCHILD OF
THE RAILWAY LABOR ACT
N 1936 Congress enacted Title II of the Railway Labor Act.' Thereby
it extended to the airlines a labor law designed by and for the railroad
industry.2
A number of factors influenced the Congressional decision. In 1936 close
regulation of almost every facet of air transportation, from personnel
qualifications to route allocation, was already well-established practice.3
This provided ready evidence of the public interest in airline health and
undoubtedly helped overcome any Congressional reluctance to take over air
labor relations. In addition, probably a strong consideration in favor of
Title II was the expectation, never fulfilled, that air controls would soon be
centralized in the Interstate Commerce Commission, the same agency which
49 STAT. 1189 (1936), 45 U.S.C. §181 (1946).
2 Inclusion of the airlines under the coverage of the Railway Labor Act had
been proposed and rejected several times before. Representative La Guardia in-
troduced the first bill to extend the Act on April 1, 1932, but it failed to receive
the backing of the railroad unions. Another bill was proposed shortly thereafter
which did receive the necssary railroad support. It was introduced in the House
by Mr. La Guardia and in the Senate by Senator Bingham. The Senate bill was
reported favorably but was never brought to a vote. The House bill was opposed
by several influential groups and died in committee. See PUFFER, AIR TRANS-
PORTATION 559 (1941); FEDERAL COORDINATOR OF TRANSPORTATION, HOURS, WAGES
AND WORKING CONDITIONS IN SCHEDULED AIR TRANSPORTATION 101 (1936).
3 Air transportation began as a creature of the federal government. The
Post Office Department inaugurated the first regular air-mail service in 1918 and
continued to operate domestic air-mail routes until 1925. In the latter year Con-
gress made provision for turning the air-mail service over to private carriers;
and in 1926 it passed the Air Commerce Act, providing for safety regulation and
aids to air navigation. The privately owned air transportation industry may be
said to date from 1926. It was in this year also that the first scheduled passenger
service became available. PUFFER, AIR TRANSPORTATION 2-4 (1941).
Government control today is pretty well localized in the Civil Aeronautics
Board just as railway controls are centered in the Interstate Commerce Commis-
sion. This agency was established in 1940, 54 STAT. 1235, under a reorganization
plan which modified the "bible" of the airline industry, the Civil Aeronautics Act,
52 STAT. 977 (1938); 49 U.S.C. §401 (1946). Under this Act the CAB now con-
trols practically every aspect of the airlines except labor relations, see Ballard,
Federal Regulation of Aviation, 60 HAv. L. REV. 1235 (1947), and many of its
functions have at least indirect effects on labor conditions.
One commentator has singled out the following ways in which the CAB influ-
ences airline labor relations:
(1) It prescribes the minimum qualifications which air employees in skilled
occupations must possess for certification.
(2) It determines the personnel complements that must be employed in con-
nection with flight operations.
(3) It determines what types of aircraft may be flown and the operating
rules for each.
(4) It allocates routes and approves reorganizations, thus affecting manyjobs.
(5) It controls the "ability to pay" since it controls air mail rates.
He expresses the opinion that these functions exercise a profound effect on labor
conditions and that greater cognizance should be taken of the fact. KAHN,
INDUSTRIAL RELATION IN THE AIRLINES. 404-6 (unpublished thesis in Harvard
University Library, 1950) (Dr. Kahn's thesis, subtitled "The interaction of
unions, management and government in a regulated and subsidized industry," is
the only significant survey of airline labor relations and was of considerable help
in the preparation of this Comment. It will be cited hereafter as KAHN).
Most aspects of present-day regulation were manifest by 1936. The supervi-
sory function now vested in the CAB was largely split up between the Department
of Commerce and the Interstate Commerce Commission. See JOHNSON, GOVERN-
MENT REGULATION OF TRANSPORTATION 620-7 (1938).
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already governed the railroads.4 In the interest of uniformity it seemecZ
desirable to bring rail and air transportation under a single labor agency-
as well.
One of the most compelling influences, however, was the crying need for-
air labor legislation of some form. Several serious squabbles had already
disturbed the infant air industry. 5 To be sure, the Wagner Act, 6 then in,
the process of formulation,7 would also have protected airline employees and'
fostered unionization. But federal control of industrial relations outside the,
rail industry was still practically an experiment.8 And the Railway Labor-
Act, then recently amended, 9 was regarded as the last word in sound labor-
legislation. 1° Proponents of Title II asserted that an industry so charged!
4 This expectation was frequently manifested at the hearings on the bill to,
enact Title II. See e.g., testimony of Mr. Edward G. Hamilton, legislative repre--
sentative of the Air Line Pilots Association, Hearings before Subcommittee of the,
Committee on Interstate Commerce on S. 2496, 74th Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1935).
The cry for unified transportation controls apparently is not dead yet, despite-
establishment of the CAB, Cf. S. 305 introduced into the last session of Con-
gress on January 11, 1951, and referred to the Senate Committee on Interstate-
and Foreign Commerce.
5 Most early controversy involved the aristocrats of the air labor force, the'
pilots. Depression-induced wage reductions had driven them to try to bargain
collectively. Their efforts toward organization were the genesis of the Air Line.
Pilots Association, which grew up practically overnight in 1931 and has ever-
since been probably the most effective single force in airline labor relations.
Management did not accept passively employee efforts to organize. In at-
least one case, employer intransigence was enough to lead to the bankruptcy and
dissolution of an airline. By early 1932 considerable sentiment had been mani--
fested for inclusion of the airlines under the Railway Labor Act, the only form of
federal labor control then in existence.
Further impetus toward unstable labor relations was the introduction of the'
new and faster DC-3 aircraft. At that time most carriers endeavored to change-
from a.mileage to an hourly basis of pilot compensation in order to avoid the in--
creased labor costs that would result from higher speeds. The pilots objected and
claimed they should have a share in the benefits of technological improvement..
By mutual agreement the dispute was submitted to the National Labor Board, a.
newly-established product of the National Industrial Recovery Act. The outcome.
of the controversy, the now-famous Decision 83, established a compromise system,
of pilot compensation which included base pay, hours worked and miles flown..
Decision 83, with some variations, still controls pilot pay.
On the general history of early air labor strife, see PUFFER, AIR TRANSPORTA-
TION 554-70 (1941); FEDERAL COORDINATOR OF TRANSPORTATION, HOURS, WAGES.
AND WORKING CONDITIONS IN SCHEDULED AIR TRANSPORTATION 98-114 (1936).
"49 STAT. 449 (1935), 29 U.S.C. c. 7 (1946).
7 The bill that became the Wagner Act, S. 1958, 74th Cong., 1st Sess., was
introduced on February 21, 1935. At the time of the hearings on Title II the bill'
had passed the Senate and was pending in the House. 79 CONG. REc. 2368, 7681,.
9731 (1935).8 Section 7 (a) of the National Industrial Recovery Act, 48 STAT. 195 (1933),.
which sought to protect the right of employees to organize and to bargain collec-
tively, fell with the rest of the NIRA under the Schechter decision, 295 U.S. 490.(1935). Efforts to pass the Labor Disputes Bill, introduced by Senator Wagner-
in 1934, 78 CONG. REC. 3443 (1934), had been unsuccessful. DAUGHERTY, LABOR
PROBLEMS IN AMERICAN INDUSTRY 933 (5th ed. 1941.) And the bill that was to.
become the Wagner Act was still pending. It became law on July 5, 1935. 49'
STAT. 449 (1935).
9 The original Act, 44 STAT. 577 (1926), was radically overhauled in 1934.
48 STAT. 1185 (1934). See page xxx and note 35 infra. Except for minor-
changes the Act exists today in its 1934 form. 45 U.S.C. c. 8 (1946). It will be-
cited hereafter as RAILWAY LABOR ACT.
10 See, e.g., testimony of Madam Perkins, then Secretary of Labor, that .
the Railway Labor Act embodies the fullest and most complete development of'
mediation, conciliation, voluntary agreement, and arbitration that is to be found
in any law governing labor relations ... [and the] administration of the Railway-
Labor Act ... is an outstanding example of effective administration of a labor-
law." Hearings before Committee on Commerce and Committee on Education and'
Labor on S. 3078, 75th Cong., 3d Sess. 968-9 (1938). Some recent commentators.
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with public responsibility as air transportation needed the background of
labor experience and the more detailed regulation of the Railway Labor Act.
Only its orderly routine of conference, mediation, arbitration and fact-
finding, they said, could assure stable industrial relations." Practically no
one voiced a contrary view.' 2 Title II was approved in April 1936.13
In the fifteen years since 1936 the airlines have grown up. Whether their
expansion is gauged by passenger-miles flown or revenue dollars, they have
expanded to at least ten times their 1936 size.' 4 There has been a con-
have seconded these observations. KALTENBORN, GOVERNMENTAL ADJUSTMENT OF
LABOR DISPUTES 72 (1943) ("The law is in general well-conceived and effectively
administered").
For a dissent from this view, see Northrup, The Railway Labor Act and Rail-
way Labor Disputes in Wartime, 36 AM. ECON. REV. 324 (1946). Dr. Northrup is
practically the sole recent commentator on the Railway Labor Act. The most
comprehensive discussion is contained in his recent book, as yet unpublished, THE
"MODEL LABOR LAw"--AN ANALYSIS OF THE RAILWAY LABOR ACT AND ITS ADMIN-
ISTRATION. See also his articles: The Appropriate Bargaining Unit Question Un-
der the Railway Labor Act, 60 Q. J. ECON. 250 (1946) ; Emergency Disputes Under
the Railway Labor Act, 1948, PROC. IND. REL. RESEARCH ASS'N 78; Unfair Labor
Practice Prevention Under the Railway Labor Act, 3 IND. AND LAB. REL. REV. 323
(1950). Both Dr. Northrup and his writings were of considerable assistance in
the preparation of this article.
I Mr. 0. S. Beyer, director of the Section of Labor Relations under the Fed-
eral Coordinator of Transportation, asserted: "The [Wagner] act as proposed,
while it seeks to encourage duly chosen repreqentatives of employers and em-
ployees to bargain collectively, does not provide for the orderly process of notice,
conference, mediation, arbitration, fact-finding, and conciliation available in the
event of a labor dispute in those industries subject to the Railway Labor Act. In
an industry such as air transportation, so largely charged with responsibility to
the public, and in which safety is such a large element, it is of special importance
that every legal safeguard . . . should be adopted . . ." Hearings before Subcom-
mittee of the Committee on Interstate Commerce on S. 2496, 74th Cong., 1st Sess.
27 (1935). See also statement of Mr. Hamilton, Id. at 5; FEDERAL COORDINATOR
OF TRANSPORTATION, HOURS, WAGES AND WORKING CONDITIONS IN SCHEDULED AIR
TRANSPORTATION 124 (1936).
Certainly another consideration in favor of Title II, whether vocalized or not,
must have been the fact that the Wagner Act was of dubious constitutionality.
Fifty-eight Liberty League lawyers pronounced it unconstitutional almost at its
-inception. And the constitutional question was not finally settled in favor of the
Act until NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937). See Stern,
The Commerce Clause and the National Economy, 1933-1946, 59 HARv. L. REV.
645, 674-85 (1946).
12 Representatives of airline management were conspicuous by their absence.
At one point in the hearings the chairman asked, "Is there somebody here that is
interested on the other side of this quettion?" No one answered. Hearings before
Subcommittee of the Committee on Interstate Commerce on S. 2496, 74th Cong.,
1st Sess. 23 (1935). One well-informed source (who asks to remain unnamed)
has speculated that the airlines were so confident that the bill, like its predeces-
sors, see note 2 supra, would not pass, that they did not bother to send a represen-
tative to the hearings.
The point that the airlines had not been heard on the bill was briefly raised on
the floor of the House. But objections were brushed aside and the bill was passed.
80 CONG. REC. 5039-40 -(1936).
1 8 Id. at 5411.
14 Domestic air carriers flew 438,989 passenger miles in 1936, 6,227,932 in
1948. International carriers flew 41,829 as against 1,961,794. CIVIL AERONAU-
TICS ADMINISTRATION, STATISTICAL HANDBOOK OF CIVIL AVIATION 67, 85 (1949).
Domestic carriers' total revenues were $43 million in 1938 and $434 million in
1948. The comparable international figures are $15 million and $249 million. Id.
at 74, 89. The last few years have been even bigger for both domestic and inter-
national airlines. And the future will probably bring continued expansion. See
FORBES MAGAZINE OF BUSINESS, THIRD ANNUAL REPORT ON AMERICAN INDUSTRY
74 (1951) ; Wall Street Journal, March 22, 1951, p. 1, col. 1.
Despite this almost phenomenal growth, the airlines still play only a rela-
tively small part in the total transportation picture. In 1949 they accounted for
only 1.5% of total intercity passenger traffic and .03% of intercity freight traffic.
64 ICC ANN. REP. 22 (1950).
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comitant growth in the number of personnel employed.' 5
Such prodigious development has not, it is true, been accompanied by
much change in the essential nature of the industry's labor force. This
remains comparatively small, widely dispersed, and extremely specialized.
Today sixteen major companies share the bulk of the nation's flying busi-
ness.' 6 Each of these serves a number of cities. While a large part of an
airline's personnel may be located at its home base, some employees are
maintained at every station.' 7 And air transport workers are further dis-
tributed among various categories of flight and ground jobs.' 8 All this
segmentation takes place in a work force which even today numbers less
than eighty-five thousand, a mere six per cent of the total employees covered
by the Railway Labor Act.19
Fifteen years have, however, wrought a profound change in the char-
acter of air unionization. In 1936 collective bargaining was a new practice
for both carriers and unions; not a single air collective bargaining agree-
ment had yet been signed.20 And only one union, the Air Line Pilots Asso-
ciation, was very active in airline labor affairs. 2 ' This was a considerable
contrast to the situation on the railroads where unions were then, as they
'5 In 1936 domestic airlines employed 7,079 workers and international air-
lines 2,916. The comparable figures in 1948 were 60,416 and 23,726 respectively.
CIVIL AERONAUTICS ADMINISTRATION, STATISTICAL HANDBOOK OF CIVIL AVIA-
TION 63, 83 (1949).
16 American, Braniff, Capital, Chicago & Southern, Colonial, Continental,
Delta, Eastern, Mid-Continent, National, Northeast, Northwest, Pan American
(including Panagra and American Overseas), Trans World, United, and Western.
Five airlines account for about three-fourths of the total traffic-American,
Pan American, United, Trans World and Eastern. These companies own about
two-thirds of the total number of planes and a much greater per cent of the more
modern and largest aircraft. It is the managements of these lines that have
played a major part in shaping air industrial relations. KAHN 35.
17 American Airlines employees, for example, are scattered among seventy-
three separate stations. For a detailed breakdown of the personnel distribution
on two major airlines, see KAHN, tables XVIII and XIX, following pp. 203 and
204 respectively.
'5 For the major divisions established by the National Mediation Board for
collective bargaining purposes, see notes 23 and 68 infra.
19 The latest available figures are for 1948. In that year air employees of
both domestic and international carriers totaled slightly more than 84,000. See
note 15 supra. In the same year the employees of the nation's railroads totaled
1,345,000. THE WORLD ALMANAC 649 (Hansen ed. 1951).
20 Not until fiscal 1937 were any air collective bargaining agreements exe-
cuted and filed with the National Mediation Board as .required by RAILWAY LABOR
ACT, §5 Third (e). Four were filed that year; in fiscal 1938 the number on file in-
creased to 16. These early agreements involved mechanics and radio operators.
The pilots, despite their strong organization, did not enter into any written con-
tracts during the first few years under Title II. 4 NMB ANN. REP. 7, 30 (1938).
21 Labor organization among groups other than the pilots did not emerge in
any significant degree until after 1938. The ALPA was formed under the leader-
ship of a former pilot, David L. Behncke, in 1931. By 1932 it included more than
75% of the scheduled airline pilots in the United States. Mr. Behncke headed the
union until very recently and exercised what many have asserted to be an almost
dictatorial control over its policies. For a comprehensive analysis of recent devel-
opments in ALPA internal affairs, see AVIATION WEEK, August 6, August 13, Au-
gust 20 and August 27, 1951.
Because of its small size and centralization of control the ALPA evidently de-
cided to concentrate its early efforts in Washington. Its lobbying activities were
largely responsible for Decision 83, Title II and the Civil Aeronautics Act of 1938.
It was not until after 1938 that the ALPA turned seriously to collective bargain-
ing to extend the gains it had won in Washington. See KAHN 324; Northrup,
Collective Bargaining by Air Line Pilots, 61 Q. J. ECON. 533 (1947).
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are today, powerful national organizations. 22 Now the major airlines are
almost completely organized.2 3 Moreover, the unions active in air transpor-
tation are no longer weak aggregations struggling for recognition. At least
three of them are strong national unions with over a quarter of a million
members. 24 And the Air Line Pilots Association wields an influence which
belies the paucity of its membership.25
At the same time our national labor philosophy has changed. Early laws
followed the Wagner Act pattern of restraining employer activity and en-
couraging unions. 26 But, if the Taft-Hartley Act 27 is any evidence, na-
tional labor policy today tends to regard the parties as equals and to put
22 The railroad union movement began in the 1850's. Organization had
reached a significant stage by the time of the notorious Pullman strike in 1894.
Many of today's major railroad unions were well-established before that date. By
1929 the unions had reached such a high degree of centralization and political
maturity that they formed the Railway Labor Executives' Association to coordi-
nate rail union activities in matters of mutual interest. See MIDDLETON, RAIL-
WAYS AND ORGANIZED LABOR (1941); MONROE, RAILROAD MEN AND WAGES (1947).
23 As of June 30, 1950, the following was the state of organization in some of
the major airlines:
CRAFT or CLASS American Eastern Pan-Amer. TWA United
Pilots ALPA ALPA ALPA ALPA ALPA
Flight Engineers ACFEA ALFEA FEIA FEIA ACFEA
Radio Operators ALCEA-ARA * TWU (1) ALCEA-ARA ALCEA-ARA
Flight Navigators * * * * * FEIA TWU TWU
Mechanics TWU IAM (2) TWU IAM (3) IAM
Flight Dispatchers ALDA * ALDA ALDA ALDA
Clerical Personnel TWU (4) BRC , IAM 4 * * * IAM (8)
Flight Service Personnel ALSSA (7) ALSSA TWU ALSSA ALSSA (7)
Guards IAM . * TWU TAM * * *
ACFEA-Air Carrier Flight Engineers Association.
ALCEA-ARA-Air Line Communication Employees Association, A.R.A.. C.I.O.
ALDA-Air Line Dispatchers' Association, A. F. of L.
ALFEA-Air Line Flight Engineers Association, Inc., A. F. of L.
ALPA-Air Line Pilots Association, A. F. of L.
ALSSA-Air Line Stewards and Stewardesses Association.
BRC-Brotherhood of Railway and Steamship Clerks.
FEIA-Flight Engineers International Association.
IAM-International Association of Machinists.
TWU-Transport Workers Union of America, C.I.O.(1) Includes flight radio officers.
(2) Includes stockroom personnel and cargo handlers.
(3) Includes fire inspectors, commissary clerks, stockroom personnel and cargo handlers.
(4) Stockroom personnel only.
(5) Includes teletype operators.
(6) Includes truck drivers, stockroom personnel and cargo handlers.
(7) Stewardesses only.
For complete data on all major air carriers, see 16 NMB ANN. REP. 74-5
(1950).
24 The United Auto Workers, C.I.O., has almost a million members, the Inter-
national Association of Machinists has almost 600,000, and the Brotherhood of
Railway Clerks about 350,000. 4 BUREAU OF NATIONAL AFFAIRS, LABOR POLICY
AND PRACTICE §263 (1950). The Transport Workers Union, which is becoming
-increasingly active in airline affairs, has about 95,000 members. PETERSON,
HANDBOOK OF LABOR UNIONS 391 (1944).
25 The ALPA has only about 6100 members. 4 BUREAU OF NATIONAL
AFFAIRS, LABOR POLICY AND PRACTICE §263 (1950). Yet the union, "a very strate-
gically situated group .... has used its advantage to the utmost. In the face of
an extraordinary large surplus of trained pilots which the war created, it has
continued to boost the salaries of its members. Moreover, it has been unusually
adroit in the political field. Despite its limited numbers (and votes), it has won
the aid of Congress to a degree which has been exceeded by few organizations.
Taking full advantage of the 'romantic allure' of the industry and jobs, pilots,
lobbying in their smart uniforms, have impressed the legislators time and again."
Northrup, Collective Bargaining by Air Line Pilots, 61 Q. J. ECON. 533, -574
(1947).
26 The Wagner Act, citing specifically the inequality of bargaining power of
unorganized employees, declares it to be national policy to encourage collective
:bargaining and protect the freedom of employees to designate representatives of
their own choosing without interference by employers. 49 STAT. 449 (1935), 29
U.S.C. §151 (1946). A similar public policy had been declared in the Norris-
LaGuardia Act three years earlier. 47 STAT. 70 (1932), 29 U.S.C. §102 (1946).
"And it seems apparent, in retrospect, that in passing the [Wagner Act],
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similar restraints on both. 28 Against this changed background, and with
fifteen years of perspective, it is now possible to evaluate the Railway Labor
Act as it applies to the air transport industry and to determine whether
Congress' original purpose is being adequately fulfilled.
The Nature of the Railway Labor Act
The Railway Labor Act was a product of our union-fostering labor past
and the climax of almost fifty years of national railroad labor legislation.
Both trade unions and labor strife appeared early on the railroads. 29 And
the resulting problems were reflected in Congressional debate well before
the turn of the century,30 since this was clearly one business to which the
"commerce power" extended. 3 ' The present Act, culminating almost half a
century of federal experiments in the railroad labor field,32 was passed in
Congress was doing its best to provide the A. F. of L. with the means to promote
the unlimited expansion of its member unions, free from the interference of
employers." GREGORY, LABOR AND THE LAW 226 (1946).
27 61 STAT. 136 (1947), 29 U.S.C. c. 7 (Supp. 1950). This will be cited here-
after as TAFT-HARTLEY ACT.
28 "The Taft-Hartley amendments represent an abandonment of the policy of
affirmatively encouraging the spread of union organization and collective bargain-
ing . . . The Government, instead of aiding one side, now stands in the center.
The change of policy appears to be based on the belief that labor unions have be-
come so strong that legislative action was required to redress the balance of power
in the collective bargaining process." Cox, Some Aspects of the Labor Manage-
ment Relations Act, 1947, 61 HARV. L. REV. 1, 44 (1947).
Cf. "Findings and declaration of policy," TAFT-HARTLEY ACT §1.
"We cannot overlook the fact that many of the states have been taking action
to restrict union power and practices. In the legislative sessions of 1947 all but
18 states enacted one or more laws restricting union security, banning the closed
shop, prohibiting secondary strikes and boycotts, regulating picketing and requir-
ing unions to file financial statements ... The Federal law must, therefore, be seen
in its context of a rising popular demand for legislative reformation of union
activities." McKelvey, The Wagner Act and the Taft-Hartley Act, lecture at El-
mira College, Dec. 8, 1947.
29 See note 22 supra.
30 "As early as 1882 Congiess began the consideration of methods and de-
vices for the settlement of railway labor disputes. On June 15, 1882, Senator
Morgan of Alabama offered a resolution calling for the appointment of a commit-
tee to investigate and propose a solution for railway labor troubles. [13 CONG.
REc. 4924 (1882).] FISHER, USE OF FEDERAL POWER IN SETTLEMENT OF RAILWAY
LABOR DISPUTES 8-9 (1922).
31 See Stern, The Commerce Clause and the National Economy, 1933-1946, 59
HARv. L. REV. 645, 647-52 (1946).
.12 Federal railroad labor legislation began with the Act of 1888, providing for
voluntary arbitration and government fact-finding. The provisions were used
only once, and then unsuccessfully. The Erdman Act of 1898 placed primary reli-
ance on mediation and conciliation by temporary boards, with voluntary arbitra-
tion as a second line of defense. The Newlands Act of 1913 established a full-time
Board of Mediation and Conciliation and somewhat improved previous arbitration
provisions. But the Newlands machinery failed to produce agreement as to
whether railroad employees should have an eight hour day. The problem was set-
tled only when Congress passed the Adamson Act in 1916 and upheld labor's view.
During World War I the government took over the railroads. Under the fed-
eral Director General of Railroads the employees' right to organize without man-
agement interference was established. And bipartite boards of adjustment were
set up to handle grievance disputes.
The railroads were returned to private oyvnership in 1920; and the Trans-
portation Act of that year prescribed new techniques for settling railroad labor
disputes. the Act's provisiops were partly a reversion to the' principles of the
Act of 1888, with mediationhdiscar.ed and reliance "laced.on investigation and
recommendations by a tripartite, ninii-man Railrad Ld5 Board. But mediation
was re-adopted as the basic method of federal intervention when Congress passed
the Railway Labor Act in 1926. FISHER, USE OF FEDERAL POWER IN SETTLEMENT
OF RAILWAY LABOR DISPUTES (1922); WOLF, THE RAILROAD LABOR BOARD (1927).
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1926. 33 It was largely the result of joint efforts by rail carriers and unions,
both of whom were dissatisfied with existing dispute-settlement procedures.3 4
Under New Deal aegis, the Act received a thorough overhauling in 1934,
when some of the Wagner Act spirit of nurturing national unions was in-
jected into it. 35 Thus, as it stands today, the Act's avowed goal of avoiding
interruptions to commerce is supposedly effectuated both by guaranteeing
freedom of organization to carriers and their employees and by providing a
mechanism for the prompt and orderly settlement of disputes.8 6
The Railway Labor Act's first line of defense against labor discord is
the imposition of certain general duties to insure fair collective bargaining.
Carriers and their employees are directed to make and maintain written
33 44 STAT. 577 (1926).
.44 "These two parties [carriers and employees] were by no means the only
ones who found reason to complain about the manner in which railroad labor dis-
putes were dealt with under the provision of the Transportation Act, and who
insisted that changes be made. Resolutions were adopted by shippers' organiza-
tions, traffic clubs, and various other commercial and industrial associations . . ."
WOLF, THE RAILROAD LABOR BOARD 397 (1927). For a survey of the major faults
that critics found with the existing regulations, see Id. at 358-93.
Conferences between railroad executives and labor leaders were held as
early as January, 1925. 'A tentative bill, drafted by the conferees, was approved
by the Association of Railway Executives on December 21, 1925. Id. at 414-15.
"Following this action a committee representing the carriers and employees met
on January 5, 1926, and drafted the bill into acceptable legal form. It was pre-
sented and explained to President Coolidge on January 7, and on the following
day was introduced in both houses of Congress as identical bills." Id. at 416.
35 48 STAT. 1185 (1934).
Two'major alterations were made by the 1934 amendments. The grievance
procedure was radically altered to provide for a National Railroad Adjustment
Board instead of the optional regional or system boards provided for theretofore.
See Elgin J. & E. Ry. v. Burley, 325 U.S. 711, 725-8 (1945). And steps were
taken to eradicate company unions, "yellow dog" contracts and similar employer
abuses. See note 40 infra. For it was estimsted by one labor official that approxi-
mately 35 or 40 percent of all railroad employees were covered by "associations
and employee representation plans and local company unions outside of the stand-
and organizations." Statement of George M. Harrison, president of the Brother-
hood of Railway Clerks, Hearings Before Committee on Interstate Commerce on
S. 3266, 73rd Cong., 2d Sess. 29 (1934).
The 1934 changes were vigorously opposed by railroad management. Id. at
55-111; 78 CONG. REC. 12372-4, 12382-3 (1934). A management representative
asserted that "[t] he only difference between the Railway Labor Act of 1926 and
these amendments as proposed--outside of the adjustment features desired by the
men-is the skillful wording into section after section, or the introduction of new
sections, to bring about a cleavage between men and management through com-
pulsory unionism, compulsory only so far as certain particular [i. e. national]
unions are concerned." Statement of M. W. Clement, vice president of the Penn-
sylvania Railroad and chairman of the Committee of the Railroads Delegated to
Deal with Proposed Amendments to the Railway Labor Act, Hearings Before
Committee on Interstate Commerce on S. 3266, 73rd Cong., 2d Sess. 76 (1934).
But the rail unions were able to secure the backing of Mr. Joseph B. Eastman,
then Federal. Coordinator of Transportation and a powerful New Deal figure,
for most of their proposed changes. The combined pressure of Eastman and
the unions was enough to force through the revisions. See BERNSTEIN, THE NEW
DEAL COLLECTIVE BARGAINING POLICY 40-56 (1950)..
36 The general purposes of the Act as it now stands are set out as: "(1) To
avoid any interruption to commerce or to the operation of any carrier engaged
therein; (2) to forbid any limitation upon freedom of association among employ-
ees or any denial, as a condition of employment or otherwise, of the right of
employees to join a labor organization; (3) to provide for the complete inde-
pendence of carriers and of employees in the' pnater of self-organization; (4)
to provide for the. promgtand orderly sett'-r~ent of all disputes concerning rates
of pay, rules, or workit econdikxiSns; (5) tu'provide for the prompt and orderly
settlement of all disputes growing out of grievances or out of the interpretation
or application of agreements covering rates of pay, rules, or working conditions."
RAILWAY LABOR ACT .2.
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agreements concerning rates of pay, rules and working conditions. 37 Their
representatives are to confer regarding all disputes and to strive to achieve
expeditious settlements.38 Carriers must deal with the freely designated
representatives of their employees.8 9 And any deliberate interference with
employees' freedom to organize, such as "yellow dog" contracts or the active
fostering of company unions, subjects the offending carrier and its respon-
sible officers to severe punishment.
40
But, because conferences between management and union will not always
produce agreement, the Act seeks to maintain labor peace by establishing
a comprehensive dispute-settling framework. Two basic types of disputes
are differentiated: "matters of interest," which concern the establishment
of rates of pay, rules or working conditions, and "matters of right," which
grow out of the interpretation or application of existing contracts. 41 The
Act undertakes to treat each differently.4 2
To help settle disputes over matters of interest, the Act establishes a
three-man administrative agency-the National Mediation Board.43 If the
parties to a dispute are, unable to agree, they may invoke the aid of this
agency. Or the Board may proffer its services if it feels a labor emergency
exists. 4 4 Once involved, the Board endeavors to help the disputants to
agree.45 If unsuccessful in mediating the dispute, the Board is required to
37 The act merely prescribes that carriers and employees "exert every reason-
able effort to make and maintain agreements . . ." RAILWAY LABOR ACT §2 First.
But, since the Act also requires that every carrier file with the Mediation Board
copies of all agreements in effect with its employees, Id. at §5 Third (e), the
Board has interpreted the requirement to mean written agreements. NATIONAL
MEDIATION BOARD, FIFTEEN YEARS UNDER THE RAILWAY LABOR ACT, AMENDED,
AND THE NATIONAL MEDIATION BOARD 10 (1950),
88 RAILWAY LABOR ACT §2 Second, Sixth.
39 Id. at §2 Third, Fourth, Ninth.
An injunction may be obtained by employees to enforce their right to desig-
nate representatives without management coercion. Virginian Ry. v. System
Federation No. 40,300 U.S. .15 (1937).
40 The Railway Labor Act originally prohibited requiring a promise from
any prospective employee to join or not to join any labor organization. This
has been modified by a recent amendment which allows the union shop. See
note 86 infra. It also proscribes any carrier's use of funds to maintain any labor
organization or to pay any labor representative. But carriers are specifically
authorized to allow employees to confer during working hours without loss of
time; and they may furnish free transportation to employees who are travelling
on union business. Carriers-must post notices to advise employees of their rights
to organize and bargain collectively without employer interference. The willful
violation of any of these provisions subjects" the carrier, its officer or agent to a
fine of from $1,000 to $20,000, imprisonment up to six months or both. Each day
of willful violation is specifically made a separate offense. RAILWAY LABOR ACT §2
Fourth, Fifth; Eighth, Tenth.
41 See Hearings Before Committee on Interstate Commerce on S. 3266, 73rd
Cong., 2d Sess. 33-4 (1934).
42 "Whereas labor legislation as originally applied to the railroads . . .made
no attempt to differentiate between the various types of labor controversies but
treated them as if they were all of a kind, the amended Railway Labor Act clearly
distinguishes- different kinds of disputes, recognizes the differences in the prin-
ciples which underlie them, and provides different methods and establishes, sepa-
rate agencies for handling the various kinds. These principles, methods, and
agencies, evolved through years of experimentation, provide a model labor-rela-
tions policy .. ." NATIONAL MEDIATION BOARD, FIFTEEN YEARS UNDER THE RAIL-
WAY LABOR ACT, AMENDED, AND THE NATIONAL MEDIATION BOARD 1 (1950).
4" RAILWAY LABOR ACT §4.
The members of the board are appointed for three-year terms, one member's
tenure expiring each year. No more than two of the members may be of the
same political party. Ibid.
44 Id. at §5 First.
4 Ibid.
Each of the Board's three members and any of its staff may act in a medi-
ating capacity. In addition to its office personnel the Board has a staff of media-
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urge the parties voluntarily to submit their dispute to a binding arbitra-
tion.46 If arbitration is refused and the dispute threatens substantially to
interrupt interstate commerce, the Board must notify the President. He,
at his discretion, may establish an "emergency board" to investigate the
dispute and make recommendations for settlement.47 While the recom-
mendations are not binding, it was thought that the prestige of the Presi-
dent and the force of public opinion would virtually compel their accep-
tance.411 During the whole of this procedure, and for thirty days after the
emergency board's report, the parties may not change the conditions out
of which the dispute arose.
49
Disputes over matters of right, generally of lesser significance, are
given more summary disposition. Title II specifically requires the estab-
lishment of "boards of adjustment" to umpire grievance or contract-inter-
pretation disputes which subordinate management and union officials cannot
settle.50 Pursuant to this directive most lines have established system-wide
tors, selected through the Civil Service, who spend most of their time in the field.
Only a small proportion of the mediation conferences are held in Washington.
NATIONAL MEDIATION BOARD, FIFTEEN YEARS UNDER THE RAILWAY LABOR ACT,
AMENDED, AND THE NATIONAL MEDIATION BOARD 7, 9 (1950).
If the Board's mediation efforts meet with success, a mediation agreement
will be drawn up to embody the accord. If at some later date a controversy arises
over the mdaning of this agreement, the Board, after a hearing of both sides, must
give its interpretation of the agreement. RAILWAY LABOR ACT §5 Second. The
function of interpreting mediation agreements is relatively insignificant. The
Board has, for example, been called on to interpret only two agreements in the
past three years. 16 NMB ANN. REP. 82 (1950); 15 NMB ANN. REP. 62 (1949);
14 NMB ANN. REP. 63 (1948).
46 RAILWAY LABOR ACT §5 First.
The provisions for the appointment of an arbitration board and the conduct
of the arbitration are contained in §7, 8 and 9 of the Act. The parties to an
arbitration each name one arbitrator (or two, if they have agreed on a board of
six). The remaining arbitrator (or arbitrators) is chosen by those named by the
parties or, if they cannot reach agreement, by the Mediation Board. RAILWAY
LABOR ACT §5 Third (a).
17 RAILWAY LABOR ACT §10.
The President has discretion as to the creation of the board, its size and
composition and the compensation of its members. A new board must be created
for each emergency. The board must make its report to the President within
thirty days after its creation. Ibid.
48 "[T]his board, with all its power and prestige, can go to the public and
crystalize public opinion against the parties responsible for not maintaining
peace.
"I can not conceive of a body of public officials that,would be more capable
of exerting pressure to bring about a settlement. . . 2" Statement of Donald R.
Richberg, counsel for the organized railway employees, Hearings Before Com-
mittee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce on H. R. 7180, 69th Cong., 1st Sess.
19 (1926).
49 RAILWAY LABOR ACT §§2 Seventh, 6, 10.
50 RAILWAY LABOR ACT §204.
System-wide and regional boards were regarded as a sort of interim measure.
The Act envisages eventual establishment of a National Air Transport Adjust-
ment Board, with two carrier and two union members. This. Board, which would
hear all disputes from all carriers and all classes of employees, is to be set up
whenever the National Mediation Board deems it necessary. Id. at §205. How-
ever, there seems to be general satisfaction with the present local boards; and
establishment of a national board seems most unlikely. See statement of Francis
A. O'Neill, Jr., chairman of the National Mediation Board, Hearings Before
Subcommittee on Appropriations on Appropriations for 1951, 81st Cong., 2d
Sess. 988 (1950).
On the other hand, the Act makes a National Railroad Adjustment Board
mandatory. RAILWAY LABOR ACT §3. This was one of the major innovations of the
1934 amendments. It is the only aspect of the Act's operation that has been
subject to intensive analysis and comment. See, e.g., JONES, INQUIRY RELATING TO
THE NATIONAL RAILROAD ADJUSTMENT BOARD (1940); SPENCER, THE NATIONAL
RAILROAD ADJUSTMENT BOARD (1938); Garrison, The National Railroad Adjust-
inent Board: A Unique Administrative Agency, 46 YALE L.J. 567 (1937).
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adjustment boards for each craft or class. 51 These generally consist of four
members, two designated by management and two by the union. 52 An in-
creasing number of the boards provide for the naming of a fifth neutral
member in case of deadlock. 53 The adjustment boards have exclusive pri-
mary jurisdiction over all matters of right that come within their purview. 54
Their decisions are enforceable in the courts.55 And in an enforcement
suit their findings are given the weight of prima facie evidence. 6
51 Consensus of replies received by the author from major airlines in answer
to questionnaire.For a detailed description of the pre-adjustment board grievance procedure
on one major airline, see KAHN, Chart X, following p. 396.
52 Members are generally designated by their sponsors for a period of one
year. As a rule, company officers and union officials are named. Theoretically
at least, the members of the board are given a free hand to decide cases on their
merits rather than on the basis of individual loyalties to management or union.
Id. at 396.
53 "Where the parties are unable to agree upon a neutral to serve as referee
the National Mediation Board is frequently called upon to name such neutrals.
Such referees serve without cost to the Government and although the Board is
not required to make such appointments under the law, it does so in the interest
of promoting stable labor relations on the airlines." 16 NMB ANN. REP. 80
(1950).
54 Until recently it was believed that an employee with a grievance could
either complain to his adjustment board or sue in a court on the terms of the
contract. And the election of a forum, once made, was binding. Cf. Moore v.
Illinois Central R.R. 312 U.S. 630 (1940).
But two recent Supreme Court decisions have pointed out that the admin-
istrative remedy is exclusive and must be exhausted before application to the
courts. Both cases held it improper for a state court to render a declaratoryjudgment in a dispute which had not been carried through to the National Rail-
road Adjustment Board. Slocum v. Delaware L. & W. RR., 339 U.S. 239 (1950);
Order of Railway Conductors v. Southern Ry., 339 U.S. 255 (1950). For the
implications of these decisions, with particular reference to the railroad industry,
see Comment, Railroad Labor Disputes and the National Railroad Adjustment
Board, 18 U. OF CHI. L. REV. 303 (1951).
55 RAILWAY LABOR ACT §3 First (p.), (9).
The scope of 'judicial review of adjustment board rulings has troubled the
courts on numerous occasions. The Act provides that decisions shall be "final
and binding . . . except insofar as they shall contain a money award." The
person for whose benefit an order is made may bring an enforcement suit if neces-
sary. But the losing party has no way to secure review of the board's ruling
except to refuse to accede to the order and hope his adversary will bring the case
to court. By doing this he undertakes the danger of being subjected to two years
accrued damages if the beneficiary of the award waits the full statutory period
before filing suit for enforcement. Ibid. And the beneficiary, almost always the
union since practically all grievance complaints are initiated by employees, may
refuse to sue at all and use strike threats to enforce the award. Nevertheless,
the carrier may not go to court for a declaratory judgment. Washington Ter-
minal Co. v. Boswell, 124 F. 2d 235 (D. C. Cir. 1941), cert. denied 315 U.S. 795
(1942), noted at 51 YALE L, J. 666 (1942).
Even in a worse position is the employee to whom the adjustment board
denies relief. Since he has no award to enforce, he cannot get into court. See,
e.g., Berryman v. Pullman Co., 48 F. Supp. 542 (Mo. 1942). And under the
Slocum case, see note 54 sv'pra, he had no choice but to submit his grievance
to the adjustment board. This situation has led to assertions that adjustment
board procedure should be made more formal to insure such a plaintiff a fair
hearing. Comment, Railroad Labor Disputes and the National Railroad Adjust-
ment Board, 18 U. OF CHI. L. REV. 303 (1951).
However, where courts have felt that adjustment board procedures did
deny an employee a fair hearing, they have sometimes permitted judicial review
of an adverse ruling. See, e.g., Elgin, J. & E. RR. v. Burley, 325 U.S. 711 (1945) ;
Edwards v. Capital Airlines, 176 F. 2d 755 (D.C. Cir. 1949) cert. denied, 338 U.S.
885 (1949). The latter case involved the ruling of an airline system board of
adjustment. While stating that "the award of the Board is entitled to presump-
tive weight of validity, and he who would upset it must bear a considerable
burden," id. at 760, the court concluded that, under the circumstances, the ag-
grieved employees were entitled to have a court examine the award. Dictum in
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But not all disputes fall neatly into either the "matters of interest" or
"matters of right" category. Most conspicuous are disagreements over who
is entitled to act as the employees' bargaining representative. 5 7 Such ques-
tions entail decision as to what is the appropriate bargaining unit 58 and
who is the choice of a majority of its members. Not knowing what else to
do with it, the Railway Labor Act gives the function of making these deci-
sions to the National Mediation Board.
5 9
The Impact of Title II
Whether application of the Railway Labor Act did, or does, contribute
much to stability and harmony in airline industrial relations may well be
questioned. 0 Certainly, unionization of the airlines and the acceptance of
collective bargaining have been achieved during the fifteen years of the
Act's tutelage. But these might have been similarly accomplished under
the Wagner Act; the state of air labor organization in 1936 was far more
similar to that of major in~lustries generally than to the comparatively
unique set-up in the rail industry.61 Other forms of transportation devel-
oped their labor relations without such specialized treatment. 62
the Edwards case indicates that the courts may be more willing to review system
board rulings than they are to scrutinize awards of the somewhat more formal
National Railroad Adjustment Board. Id. at 760-1.
5 RAILWAY LABOR ACT §3 First (p.).
At least one court has felt that, because adjustment board personnel are so
familiar with the operations of the carrier, the boards' findings should be "...
probative, not merely presumptive in value, having effect fairly comparable to
that of expert testimony." Washington Terminal Co. v. Boswell, 124 F. 2d 235,
241 (D.C. Cir. 1941).
57 Other disputes which come up under the Act and which are not strictly
either matters of interest or of right include inability to agree on a third arbi-
trator, see note 46 supra, on a fifth, neutral adjustment board member, see note
53 supra, and on the interpretation of a mediation agreement, see note 45 supra.
58 The Act prescribes that the bargaining unit be a "craft of class." RAIL-
WAY LABOR ACT §2 Fourth. But it was necessary that some arbiter be provided
to decide the extent of "craft or class" in actual situations. The importance of
that decision and the power over the character of the labor picture which is
inherent in it are discussed in Northrup, The Appropriate Bargaining Unit
Question Under the Railway Labor Act, 60 Q. J. ECON. 250 (1946).
59 RAILWAY LABOR ACT §2 Ninth.
The function was given to the Board despite strenuous objection, including
that of Samuel E. Winslow, Chairman of the United States Board of Mediation,
the counterpart of the National Mediation Board under the 1926 Act. See Hear-
ings Before Committee on Interstate Commerce on S. 3266, 73rd Cong., 2d Sess.
134-5 (1934).
13 The matter is, to say the least, a controversial one. David L. Behncke,
former president of the Air Line Pilots Association, recently asserted that "[t]he
Railway Labor Act has fit the airline industry in the same natural glovelike
fashion as it has the railroads." Hearings Before Subcommittee on Railway
Labor Act Amendments of Committee on Labor and Public Welfare on S. 3463,
81st Cong., 2d Sess. 496 (1950). Robert Ramspeck, then executive vice president
of the Air Transport Association of America, had said several months before
that "experience . . .has convinced us that this act, which was tailored to meet
[sic.] the problems of the railroads and their unions, just does not fit the airline
industry . . ." Hearings before Subcommittee on Railway Labor Act Amend-
ments of Committee on Labor and Public Welfare on S. 3295, 81st Cong., 2d Sess.
215 (1950).
61 Unions had been firmly entrenched on the railroads for many years. See
note 22 supra. Even as early as 1910 almost a third of railway workers were
union members. DAUGHERTY, LABOR PROBLEMS IN AMERICAN INDUSTRY 408 (5th
ed. 1941). But the modern union movement, as exemplified-by the steel, auto and
textile industries, was mostly a product of the New-Deal thirties. Like the
airlines, these industries have grown from a practically unorganized state in the
early thirties to their present high percentages of union membership. See
MILLIS & MONTGOMERY, ORGANIZED LABOR 192-201 (1945); LABOR PROBLEMS IN
AMERICA 258-64 (Stein & Davis ed. 1940).
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The Unionization of Airline Employees
Imposition of the Railway Labor Act largely predetermined the nature
of airline unionization. The Act directs that the employee bargaining unit
be a "craft of class." 65 The connotations of that phrase, built up in a
railroad context, virtually guaranteed a union structure in the airlines
closely parallel to that of the rail industry.6 4 Further assurance of this
result was the fact that responsibility for applying the phrase to specific
situations is vested in the National Mediation Board-the scion of a long
line of railroad labor agencies. 65 The Board's thinking was, and is, neces-
sarily railroad-oriented. 6
Natural growth and Mediation Board policies have pretty well crystal-.
lized bargaining units in the air industry. The Board's rulings have estab-
lished a narrow interpretation of "craft or class." 67 Today nine major
62 For brief surveys of the history and extent of union development in the
maritime trucking, street railway and bus industries, see Taft, Brief Review, in
How COLLECTIVE BARGAINING WORKS 934-40, 948-52 (Twentieth Century Fund
ed. 1945).
63 RAILWAY LABOR ACT §2 Fourth.
"The Railway Labor Act does not define the terms 'craft or class' in which
the majority is given the right to determine representation. Whether the terms
are used synonymously or whether a class comprises several crafts or vice versa
is not explained. In making rules to govern elections and designating the em-
ployees who may participate in such elections, the Board [NMB] in most cases
has been confronted with disputes as to whether the employees involved constitute
one class or craft, or-whether they are several distinct crafts for each of which
separate representatives are to be chosen by separate majorities." NATIONAL
MEDIATION BOARD, FIFTEEN YEARS UNDER THE RAILWAY LABOR ACT, AMENDED,
AND THE NATIONAL MEDIATION BOARD 16 (1950).
64 "Over the years most of the main craft or class issues have been resolved.
Thus there is a rather extensive body of precedents for settlement of such issues
without the necessity of public hearings." Ibid.
The problem of "craft or class" may be exemplified by the decision regarding
the group to which airline stores personnel belong. These employees provide
parts, materials and tools for the mechanics. But they were not included within
the mechanics bargaining unit. Because it was standard railroad practice, the
determination was made that they belonged in the general clerical craft or class.
Hearings before Subcommittee of Committee on Labor and Public Welfare on
S. 3295, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 219 (1950).
"[Tihe Board also divided the janitors working for the airlines into two
classes-the ones which work in the shops being in the mechanics class and the
ones working in the offices being in the clerks class. While this followed the
railroad precedent, it created something of a problem for the airlines, since
many of the airlines-Capital Airlines, for example-have their company offices
in the same hangars where their major mechanical work is done. Splitting a
natural occupational group in this way is bound to cause jurisdictional disputes
and unrest." Id. at 220
65 RAILWAY LABOR ACT §2 Ninth.
The present National Mediation Board replaced the Board of Mediation
which had been set up under the 1926 Act. 44 STAT. 579 (1926). This, in turn,
had replaced the old Railroad Labor Board, established under Title III of the
Transportation Act of 1920. 41 STAT. 470 (1920). And this board took the place
of the Board of Mediation and Conciliation which the Newlands Act set up in
1913. 38 STAT. 108 (1913).
66 Such an orientation could be expected since the Board had years of
experience in railroad affairs before it ever faced an airline representation dis-
pute. And, even today, airline cases make up only a small percentage of the
Board's work. Of the 2288 representation cases handled by the Board since
its inception, only 198 have concerned the airlines. 16 NMB ANN. REP. 38, 41(1950). And, since the 1934 amendments authorized the transfer to the National
Mediation Board of the old Board of -Mediation's staff, RAILWAY LABOR ACT §4,
Fifth, most of the present Board employees probably have roots deep in the
railroad past.
67 There seems to be no overpowering reason why "class" could not -have
been interpreted liberally to permit a single industrial bargaining unit or two
broad unions, one for flight crews and one for ground personnel. Many airline
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"crafts or classes" are recognized.68 The Board refuses to allow the bargain-
ing unit to be less than system-wide nor smaller than "well recognized crafts
or classes." 69
The suitability to the air transport industry of the present system of
craft bargaining units is dubious. In the first place, the existing setup tends
to lead to jurisdictional problems.7 0 In addition, the freedom of air em-
ployees to choose the bargaining unit they themselves prefer is considerably
restricted. A greater degree of employee choice seems more likely to pro-
duce satisfied workers than the rather narrow stratification imposed under
the Railway Labor Act.
7 1
Even after the bargaining unit is fixed, influence of the Mediation Board
over who will act as employee representative continues. The Railway Labor
Act provides that the bargaining representative shall be determined by
the majority of a craft or class. 72 In case there is disagreement, the Board
must discover the will of the majority.73 To do this it usually holds an
people would have preferred this. Northrup, The Appropriate Bargaining UnitQuestion Under the Railway Labor Act, 60 Q. J. ECON. 250, 266 (1946). But
the Board evidently felt bound by its railroad decisions which interpreted
"class" as tantamount to "craft."
68 Pilots; flight engineers; radio and teletype operators; flight navigators;
mechanics; flight dispatchers; clerical personnel; flight service personnel; and
guards. A few numerically insignificant groups are also treated separately.
E. g., truck drivers, flight kitchen personnel, meterologists. 16 NMB ANN. REP.
74-5 (1950).
An interesting comparison may be drawn between Railway Labor Act and
Taft-Hartley Act handling of guards and supervisors in determining the appro-
priate bargaining unit. Though no statutary provision prescribes that it do so,
the National Mediation Board does treat guards as a separate unit. However,
it does not require that they be represented by a different union from other
employees. Nor is any distinction made under the Railway Labor Act between
the treatment of supervisors and their subordinates. The Act covers both "em-
ployees" and "subordinate officials." RAILWAY LABOR ACT §1 Fifth. See 16 NMB
ANN. REP. 22-3 (1950).
In contrast, guards are excluded from regular unions under the Taft-Hartley
Act. TAFT-HARTLEY ACT §9(6) (3). And supervisors are regarded as repre-
sentatives of the employer and do not come within the scope of the Act. TAFT-
HARTLEY ACT §14(a). This is probably the more desirable policy. Since guards
must protect employers' rights, they should have no fraternal ties to other
workers. And supervisors are properly management representatives, not em-
ployees.
69"[Tlhe Board has ruled on many occasions that representation disputes
in any craft or class must be determined on a system-wide basis, and cannot be
confined to the employees in any particular geographical area." 16 NMB ANN.
REP. 22 (1950).
To bolster its reluctance to permit any innovations in the field of "craft or
class" designation, the Board calls out a parade-of-horribles argument. "To
permit such divisions would give rise to more divisions and subdivisions. Once
the bars are down, there is no logical stopping place and such a course would
ultimately defeat real collective bargaining as contemplated by the law. On
the other hand; stabilization of well recognized crafts or classes as they have
been generally established on carriers under the act by the employees and
managements after long years of negotiations will tend to stabilize collective
bargaining relationships." Ibid.
70 Cf. note 64 supra.
71 Cf. TAFT-HARTLEY ACT §§7, 9(b). (Employees may choose craft unit,
plant unit, employer unit, or no union at all.)
For a clear and comprehensive discussion of how the National Labor Rela-
tions Board, the Taft-Hartley Act arbiter of bargaining unit disputes, has
dealt with craft unit problems to provide a maximum of free choice without a
multiplicity of separate units, see Rathbun, The Taft-Hartley Act and Craft Unit
Bargaining, 59 YALE L. J. 1023 (1950).
72 RAILWAY LABOR ACT §2 Fourth.
7R Id. at §2 Ninth.
The Board is authorized to take a secret ballot of employees or to use any
other appropriate method. Ibid. While a check of authorizations given by the
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election in which each employee is asked to vote for his choice among the
several listed organizations. 74 But Mediation Board ballots list only the
unions involved. Consequently, an employee desiring not to be represented
by any union must either write in "no union" or refuse to vote. 7  ,
Other aspects of representation proceedings under the Railway Labor
Act are equally unsuited to a young and growing industry whose labor
picture is so dynamic. 76 No means is provided whereby employees may
petition to decertify a bargaining agent with which they are dissatisfied.
Thus, once a union is entrenched as bargaining agent, the only way it may
be dislodged is by certification of another union to take its place. 77 And
the Mediation Board will not hold a certification election more often than
every two years. 78 Moreover, while an employer clearly has an interest in
individual employees is sometimes used, Board policy, generally speaking, is
against this technique. "The presence of authorizations and counter authoriza-
tions is no reliable indication of the true desires of employees for representation.
It is only when the employee is given an opportunity to vote by secret ballot that
his true desires are expressed .... " 16 NMB ANN. REP. 19-20 (1950).
74 Through fiscal 1949 the Board had handled 164 airline representation dis-
putes. Of these, 46 were withdrawn, dismissed, or otherwise closed without
certification. Of the disputes in which certification was made, 94 were deter-
mined by a vote and only 24 were resolved by a check of authorizations. KAHN
A5-21.
Considerable question has arisen in the past as to how strong a vote a union
must receive in order to attain certification. In the early days the Board required
that a majority of those employees eligible to vote must vote for the union. But,
pursuant to the decision in System Federation No. 40 v. Virginian Ry., 11
F.Supp. 621 (E.D.Va. 1935), aff'd, 84 F.2d 641 (4th Cir. 1936) and 300 U.S. 515(1937), the Board changed its policy to require only that the union receive a
majority of votes cast in an election in which a majority of eligible voters
participate. This ruling was repeatedly challenged by those who asserted that
any majority vote should be adequate. However, the Board's policy was bolstered
by a 1947 opinion of the Attorney General. 40 OPs. ATT'Y GEN. 541 (1947). This
stated that, while the Board has the power to certify a representative which
receives a majority vote even though less than a majority of eligible voters
participate in the election, its practice of requiring majority participation is
within its discretion. NATIONAL MEDIATION BOARD, FIFTEEN YEARS UNDER THE
RAILWAY LABOR ACT, AMENDED, AND THE NATIONAL MEDIATION BoARD 14-15(1950). A recent appeal by an airline union resulted in a court decision to the
same effect. Radio Officers' Union v. National Mediation Board, 181 F. 2d 801(D.C. Cir. 1950).
75 Hearings before Subcommittee of Committee on Labor and Public Welfare
on S.3295, 81st Cong., 2d. Sess. 222 (1950).
It is noteworthy that, if there is lack of cooperation among the workers
opposed to unionization, a small but active union minority can install a union
as bargaining agent for the entire unit. Assume 26 percent of the workers are
pro-union and 74 percent prefer no union. If 49 percent of the workers, all anti-
union, stay away from the polls but all other workers vote, there will be majority
participation. And the 26 percent of union supporters will outvote the partici-
pating 25 percent of union opponents.
"In dealing with this question as far as railroad employees are concerned,
the issue as to whether a particular bargaining unit wants to be represented
by a union at all is not usually important, since rail employees have been
organized for many years. However, since air transportation is a young industry,
with employee organization a relatively new thing, this issue is an important
one." Ibid.
76 [L]abor agreement structures have not been standardized to the same
degree as on the railroads." 16 NMB ANN. REP. 2 (1950). During the late 1940's
there were a particularly large number of representation disputes in the airlines.
E. g., 42 in fiscal 1947, 46 in fiscal 1948. 13 NMB ANN. REP. 19 (1947); 14 NMB
ANN. REP. 23 (1948). Activity has declined to some extent in the past year or
two. E. g., 21 in fiscal 1950. 16 NMB ANN. REP. 42 (1950).
77 There is apparently no way in which employees can return to a union-free
status.
78 "This policy derives from the law which imposes upon both carriers and
employees the duty to exert every reasonable effort to make and maintain
agreements. Obviously, this basic purpose of the law cannot be realized if the
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having representation disputes among his employees quickly settled, he is
not regarded as an "interested party" nor allowed to request a certification
election.7 9 These policies inhibit the free choice so necessary in an industry
where ideas are still changing as new developments take place.80
Probably none of these failings in representation procedure would be
quite so serious if the proceedings were subject to judicial review. But it is
now well established that the Mediation Board's certification is the final
word; its decisions are not appealable.
8
'
And the National Mediation Board itself is not happy with its repre-
sentation responsibilities. Even on its face the Railway Labor Act appears
somewhat to destroy the "model" dichotomy between matters of interest
and matters of right 82 by giving to the Board, a dispute-settling agency,
the controversial function of settling representation quarrels. In practice,
the Board has frequently observed that active involvement in such matters
creates ill-will and detracts from its effect as a conciliator.83 It has there-
fore adopted the unfortunate but easy expedient of reapplying past rulings,
which, more often than not, were made for the railroads.8
4
The present structure of air unionization, a partial product of both
Railway Labor Act provisions and National Mediation Board policies, seems
representation issue is raised too frequently. In addition, representation elections
and the organizing campaigns which necessarily precede them cause unsettled
labor conditions and, in many cases, disturb employees substantially in the dis-
charge of their duties." 16 NMB ANN. REP. 21 (1950).
79 If the Board conducts a hearing on the subject of the bargaining unit, it
may allow the carrier to attend and testify. But this is purely discretionary.
The carrier has no right to be present. See NATIONAL MEDIATION BOARD, FIFTEEN
YEARS UNDER THE RAILWAY LABOR ACT, AMENDED, AND THE NATIONAL MEDIATION
BOARD 28 (1950).80 The Taft-Hartley solution seems fairer. It allows thirty percent of the
employees to present a request for decertification of a representative, allows
elections every year, and gives employers the right to petition for a certification
electioit. TAFT-HARTLEY ACT §9 (C). Moreover, the ballots used by the National
Labor Relations Board, the Taft-Hartley administrative agency, contain a specific
place where employees may vote for "no union." See, e.g., Interlake Iron Corp.,
4 N.L.R.B. 55, 60 (1937).
81 "Here . .. the intent seems plain-the dispute was to reach its last
terminal point when the administrative finding was made. There was to be no
dragging out of the controversy into other tribunals of law." Switchmen's
Union v. National Mediation Board, 320 U.S. 297, 305 (1943).
Certifications by the National Labor Relations Board are also non-reviewable.
The only way they may be subjected to judicial scrutiny is if the employer
refuses to deal with the designated representative and thereby embroils himself
in an unfair labor practice proceeding which comes before the courts on appeal.
See Atlanta Metallic Casket Co. v. United Paperworkers, 87 F.Supp. 718
(N.D.Ga. 1949). Presumably, review of a National Mediation Board repre -
sentation decision might likewise be had if a court of equity were asked to
enforce a certificate of the Board. Switchmen's Union v. National Mediation
Board, 320 U.S. 297, 307 (1943).
For a discussion of some of the inequities which result from the general
non-reviewability of Board decisions, see Northrup & Dunne, Administrative
Discretion, Judicial Review and Discriminatory Bargaining Units, 4 LAW. GuILD
REV. 2 (1944).
82 See note 42 supra.
83 "The time consumed by the Board in disposing of these disputes, coupled
with the ill-will engendered by them, as well as their bad effect on the morale
of the service, has prompted the Board upon several occasions to urge that the
parties involved in such disputes exert every effort to adjust them at home
and among themselves instead of bringing them to the Board. Frankly, the
Board does not consider that the purposes of the Railway Labor Act are best
served by permitting these disputes to acquire sufficient magnitude to make it
necessary to refer them to the Board for adjudication." NATIONAL MEDIATION
BOARD, FIFTEEN YEARS UNDER THE RAILWAY LABOR ACT, AMENDED, AND THE
NATIONAL MEDIATION BOARD 20 (1950).
84 See, e.g., note 64 supra.
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destined to solidify under the new union shop amendment. Until last year
the Railway Labor Act prohibited all forms of union security.8 5 But in
January, 1951, Congress passed an amendment which allows both the union
shop and voluntary "check-off" of union dues.88 This amendment, coupled
with the absence of decertification proceedings, makes it unlikely that present
unions can be unseated.
Unfair Labor Practices
The dominant position of the present unions is further assured by the
Railway Labor Act's lack of any effective proscription of union unfair labor
practices. While it does impose very real restrictions on employe'r activity,
7
the Act is practically silent concerning the obligations of unions.88 It'
provides only in general terms that employees must bargain collectively,
85 "Union security" is the generic term used to describe such labor contract
provisions as required union membership (the "closed shop" or "union shop")
and the automatic deduction from wages of union dues (the "check-off"). The
Railway Labor Act, as amended in 1934, prohibited employers from deducting
any dues or other contributions from wages and proscribed any sort of employee
agreements to join or not to join any labor organization. RAILWAY 'LABOR ACT
§2 Fourth, Fifth. While these prohibitions were designed primarily to eradicate
company unions, they were worded in terms of "any labor organization" because
of the prevailing opinion that any method of tying up men's jobs with union
membership inhibited freedom of choice. See statement of Joseph B. Eastman,
Federal Coordinator of Transportation, Hearings before Committee on Interstate
Commerce on S.3266. 73rd Cong., 2d Sess. 157 (1934).
8 Pub. L. No. 914, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. (Jan. 10, 1951). The provisions of.
the new amendment make Railway Labor Act union security provisions essen-
tially similar to those of the Taft-Hartley Act. Cf. TAFT-HARTLEY ACT §§8(a)(3), 302(c) (4) as modified by S. 1959, 82nd Cong., 1st Sess., which became law
several months ago. Wall Street Journal, October 10, 1951, p. 2, col. 
2. -
87 In this regard the Railway Labor Act and the Taft-Hartley Act are
quite similar. Both prohibit the employer from: interfering with employees'
freedom to join or organize a union; interfering with or contributing financial
or other support to any labor organization; and influencing or coercing member-
ship or non-membership in a labor organization in any way except that provided
by authorized union shop clauses. Both also require that the employer bargain
collectively with the duly authorized representatives of his employees. And
under both acts any deduction from employee wages must be authorized in writ-
ing. Compare RAILWAY LABOR ACT §2 as modified by Pub. L. No. 914, 81st Cong.,
2d Sess. (Jan. 10, 1951) ivith TAFT-HARTLEY ACT §§8(a), 302(c) (4).
88 In contrast, the Taft-Hartley Act provides a comprehensive list of union
unfair labor practices. TAFT-HARTLEY ACT §8 (b).
Under that act labor organizations are forbidden:
(1) To restrain or coerce employees in their free exercise of the right to
join or refrain from joining a union. Id. at §8 (b) (1) (A).
(2) To restrain or coerce an employer in the free choice of a representative
for collective bargaining or the adjustment of grievances. Id. at §8(b) (1) (B).
. (3) To cause or attempt to cause an employer to discriminate against an
employee in regard to any condition of employment in order to encourage or
discourage membership in a labor organization. Id. at §8 (b) (2).
(4) To cause or attempt to cause an employer to discriminate against an
employee whose union membership has been denied or terminated on grounds
other than his failure to pay required initiation fees and dues. Ibid.
(5) To refuse to bargain' collectively with an employer whose employees it
represents. Id. at §8(b)(3).
(6) To engage in or induce engagement in any secondary boycott, jurisdic-
tional dispute, or strike to induce an employer or self-employed person to join
any employer or labor organization. Id. at §8(b) (4).
(7) To strike to force recognition of a union as employees' representative
when another union has been properly certified or to force assignment of work
to particular employees. Ibid.
(8) To require of employees covered by a union shop agreement initiation
fees which the NLRB finds excessive or discriminatory. Id. at §8(b) (5).
(9) To cause or attempt to cause/employers to pay "in the nature of an
extraction" for services not performed or not to be performed. Id. at §8(b) (6).
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follow established dispute procedure, and not interfere with the employer's
choice of bargaining agent.8 9
Moreover, the sanctions provided in the Railway Labor Act are applic-
able only to employers.20 And even against them the enforcement mech-
anism is quite inefficient. The Act's only remedy against an offending
employer is a criminal penalty 91-and a rather severe one at that.9 2 This
will be imposed only after a full-fledged trial and a finding that the violation
was "willful." 98 As a matter of fact, the procedure is so cumbersome and
entails such severe penalties that it has practically never been invoked.
94
Where employees or their representatives have tried to induce carrier com-
pliance with the Act's collective bargaining provisions they have been
forced to seek an injunction. 95
While the Railway Labor Act provisions, like those of the Wagner Act,
were probably appropriate in the days of struggling young unions, the
present state of air unionization justifies the imposition of a code of em-
For a brief and poignant discussion of the Taft-Hartley union unfair labor
practices, see VAN ARKEL, AN ANALYSIS OF THE LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS
ACT, 1947 41-60 (1947).
89 RAILWAY LABOR ACT §2.
90 The Act's penalty provision speaks of "[t]he willful failire or refusal of
any carrier, its officers or agents to comply . . . ." Id. at §2 Tenth.91 In contrast, the Taft-Hartley Act enforcement mechanism permits a
complainant to apply to the National Labor Relations Board for a cease and
desist order. The board may issue an order requiring any violator "to cease
and desist from such unfair labor practice and to take such affirmative action
as will effectuate the policies of this subchapter ....
"The Board shall have power to petition any circuit court of appeals ... for
the enforcement of such an order . . ." TAFT-HARTLEY ACT §10 (C), (e).
Investigation of unfair labor practice charges and the issuance and prose-
cution of complaints is vested in the General Counsel of the Board. Id. at §3(d).
92 Every violation "shall be a misdemeanor, and upon conviction thereof the
carrier, officer or agent offending shall be subject to a fine of not less than $1000,
nor more than $20,000, or imprisonment for not more than six months, or both
fine and imprisonment, for each offense, and each day . . . shall constitute a
separate offense." RAILWAY LABOR ACT §2 Tenth.
93 Ibid.
The aggrieved party must apply to a United States district attorney and
induce him to institute and prosecute the action. Ibid.
Even the draughtsmen of the provision realized that a "willful" violation
would be very difficult to prove. See Hearings before Committee on Interstate
Commerce on S.3266, 73rd Cong., 2d. Sess. 152 (1934).
94 Some idea of the infrequency with which the procedure has been invoked
may be had from a statement in the National Mediation Board's annual report
for fiscal 1941. "Another legal action involved for the first time the provisions
of section 2, tenth, of the Railway Labor Act. In this case action was brought
by the Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen and the Federal grand jury returned
an indictment charging the Toledo, Peoria and Western Railroad and two of its
officers with interference in the organization of its employes in violation of the
Railway Labor Act. The indictment was the result of 6 months of investigation
by Department of Justice agents, and as heretofore stated is the first indictment
of a carrier or its officers under the amendments to the Railway Labor Act of
1934." 7 NMB ANN. REP. 9 (1941).
There are no reported decisions inwhich the penalties of section 2, Tenth,
have been applied. One case did mention, by way of dictum, that the penalties
would apply to certain employer actions under discussion. Railway Employees'
Co-op. Ass'n v. Atlanta B. & C. R.R., 22 F.Supp. 510, 513 (Ga. 1938). (Injunction
against carrier interference with employees' free choice of bargaining agent
denied. Though past employer practices were justification for invoking Railway
Labor Act penalties, held there was no imminent danger of such acts in future.)
95 While the Act makes no specific provision for this, it is apparently well-
accepted practice. Virginian Ry. v. System Federation No. 40, 300 U.S. 515
(1937).
Theoretically, another method of inhibiting employer unfair labor practices
is the Mediation Board's power to see that representation elections are con-
ducted without influence or coercion by the carrier. RAILWAY LABOR ACT §2 Ninth.
By this authority the Board could set aside any election influenced by employer
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ployee unfair labor practices.9 6 Successful collective bargaining requires
holding adversaries of equal power to the same rough standard of labor
ethics.9 7
The Prevention of Disputes
The heart of the Railway Labor Act is its elaborate program for the
settlement of disputes over matters of interest.9 8 How well it facilitates
expeditious disposal of these disputes is probably some indication of the
Act's value to the air industry. ,
Once the initial conferences between the parties have broken down, the
Railway Labor Act's first line of offense is the ability of the National Medi-
ation Board to conciliate.99 Since 1936 the Board has intervened in 273
airline disputes.' 0 0 The vast majority of these haveled to apparently suc-
cessful conclusions-mediation agreements, agreements to arbitratej or
withdrawals of one sort or another.' 0 ' Analyzed statistically, mediation in
unfair labor practices. But only two such elections have been voided during the
Act's administration. One of these was a recent case involving, Chicago &
Southern Air Lines. See Northrup, Unfair Labor Practice Prevention Under
the Railway Labor Act, 3 IND. & LAB. REL. REV. 323, 333 (1950).
96 The Taft-Hartley employee unfair labor practices constitute one system
that might well be applied to the airlines. Of course, it is possible that their
application would lead to new difficulties. It is well-accepted that the Taft-
Hartley union unfair labor practice proscriptions have not proved a panacea for
all labor ills and have even, in some instances, raised new problems. See, e.g.,
MILLIS & BROWN, FROM THE WAGNER ACT TO TAFT-HARTLEY 441-81 (1950).
Probably most troublesome of the prohibitions has been the ban on secondary
boycotts. Cf. International Brotherhood of Teamsters, 87 N.L.R.B. 502 (1949);
International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, 82 N.L.R.B. 1028 (1949). See
Comment, The Impact of the Taft-Hartley Act on the Building and Construction
Industry. 60 YALE L.J. 673 (1951).
97 The demand for "equalization" of legislative provisions was one of the
driving forces which led Congress to substitute the Taft-Hartley Act for the
Wagner Act. MILLIS & BROWN, FROM THE WAGNER ACT TO TAFT-HARTLEY 272
(1950).9 8
,Like all previous railroad labor legislation, the Railway Labor Act "was
passed to secure the prompt and orderly settlement of disputes between carriers
and their employees." Atlantic Coast Line R.R. v. Pope, 119 F.2d 39 (1941).
99 RAILWAY LABOR ACT §5.
"The mediatory services of the Board are only in order and forthcoming
where direct negotiations between the parties, diligently and conscientiously
conducted, have exhausted all possibility of effecting agreement between them.
• . . From the time, however, that the Board takes jurisdiction, the negotiations
proceed under its auspices and with the help of its representative." NATIONAL
MEDIATION BOARD, FIFTEEN YEARS UNDER THE RAILWAY LABoR ACT, AMENDED,
AND THE NATIONAL MEDIATION BOARD 10 (1950).
"Experience under the act since its passage in 1926 has proven that agree-
ments in mediation are the most satisfactory method of settling disputes of this
nature [situations which threaten to interrupt interstate commerce]. An agree-
ment reached in mediation is not made under any compulsion, and results from
a voluntary meeting of the minds, which in turn implies that both sides have
receded from their original positions at the start of the controversy. A successful
mediator is often able to suggest compromises which may preserve the basic
positions of the parties, and still result in an agreement being reached. A feeling
of good will between the parties usually comes out of a voluntary agreement,
and has a salutary effect on future negotiations." Id. at 37-8.
100 NMB ANN. REP. 53 (1950). The increased labor activity in the airlines
in the post-war period is reflected in the fact that 233 of these cases have been
handled in the past five years. Ibid; 15 NMB ANN. REP. 37 (1949); 14 NMB
ANN. REP. 36 (1948); 13 NMB ANN. REP. 32 (1947); 12 NMB ANN. REP. 33
(1946).
101 Of the 155 airline disputes which the Board mediated between 1937 and
1948, 75 resulted in mediation agreements, 24 in agreements to arbitrate, and 32
in withdrawals. For a detailed breakdown of the cases by "craft or class," see
KAHN A22-34. Even discounting the withdrawals, many of which may have left
the quarrels unresolved, the figures show almost 65% success.
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air labor disputes seems to have done a good job. 10 2 And the conciliation
background of the Board and its mediators has probably had a salutary
effect on air labor relations. When the Railway Labor Act was first imposed,
collective bargaining was new in the air transport industry. 10 3 The pres-
ence of experienced mediators no doubt facilitated understanding of the
bargaining process and aided many settlements.
10 4
However, the Board's effect on air mediation seems not altogether whole-
some. Now that management and unions are more sophisticated, the value
of having experienced mediators on hand may well have diminished. And
the fact that parties to a dispute know they have a third person to call on
for assistance leads them to rely on outside help instead of putting forth
their own best efforts to agree. 10 5 Moreover, the fact that most mediators
have a big background of railroad experience 101 may lead to future troubles
in the air industry. Railroads are plagued with the problem of paying for
work not done while airlines, so far, are not.10 7 But the presence of medi-
ators schooled in the railroad tradition makes it difficult for air carriers to
resist employees' feather-bedding demands.' 0 8 To force airlines to adopt
this practice would put a strong inhibition on technological improvement 109
and a severe financial burden on an industry that already loses money. 110
102 However, there is no way of telling how many disputes which were
brought to an apparently successful conclusion by the Board later reappeared
in a different guise.
103 Cf. note 20 supra.
104 "On the railroads where collective bargaining has been in effect for
many years and where the representation and agreement relationships have' been
more or less crystallized, the 'knowhow' and the application of the provisions of
the Railway Labor Act are quite well understood and established ....
"The airline industry now presents a somewhat different picture. This
industry has experienced rapid expansion in the recent past and many problems
have arisen as to the establishment of employer-employee relationships as pro-
vided for in the Railway Labor Act. The Board has endeavored to counsel with
the parties involved in disputes as to the procedural operations of the Railway
Labor Act and the duties of the parties thereunder, and excellent progress has
been made in this direction." NATIONAL MEDIATION BOARD, FIFTEEN YEARS
UNDER THE RAILWAY LABOR ACT, AMENDED, AND THE NATIONAL MEDIATION
BOARD 12 (1950).
'05 The Board has on several occasions noted with censure the fact that it
has been called in to mediate disputes which have not been thoroughly negotiated
between the parties. See, e.g., Id. at 11-12; 16 NMB ANN. REP. 34 (1950).
106 Cf. note 66 supra.
107 See MONROE, RAILROAD MEN AND WAGES 5-6 (1947); Hearings before
Subcommittee of Committee on Labor and Public Welfare on S.3295, 81st Cong.,
2d. Sess. 224 (1950).
108 "The airlines are concerned for fear their wage and rule agreements will
gradually develop on the same pattern as the railroads. While the airlines can
avoid this, of course, by holding fast and refusing to agree to any such conditions,
they are faced in mediation by suggestions from Mediation Board mediators that
the particular rule in controversy has long been established on the railroads.
That has happened before and it will happen again. It is hard for airline nego-
tiators to hold out against the pressure of the pattern of railroad settlements
and practices fostered by the Railway Labor Act." Ibid.
A noteworthy example of the lamentable tendency to impose railroad logic
on the airlines is the recent Civil Aeronautics Board ruling approving the ac-
quisition of American Overseas Airlines by Pan American. In its orders approv-
ing the route transfer, 1A CCH AVIATION LAW REP. 21,247, 21,272, 21,273
(1950), the Board ordered that employees be compensated for any losses suffered
(by termination of employment, reduction in salary, etc.) during a two-year
period as a result of the acquisition. The ruling follows the well-established
railroad practice. But this is no justification for applying it to an expanding,
as opposed to a contracting, industry. See 64 HARv. L. REV. 664 (1951).
109 The airline pilots are currently engaged in a campaign to have a mileage
limit put on their work month. At the same time they seek increased hourly rates
to assure the same take-home pay for flying fewer hours at increased speeds.
In this way they hope to combat the technological unemployment which will
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Arbitration, the next step prescribed if mediation fails, has been signifi-
cantly more successful in the airlines than in the railroads if statistics tell
the whole story. Out of the total of 140 rail and air arbitration settlements
which have been reached under National Mediation Board supervision, al-
most one-third have involved airlines."1 And in approximately two-thirds
of the airline cases in which the Board has proffered arbitration, both car-
rier and union have accepted. 112
One explanation for the acceptance of arbitration in air disputes-at
least by management-is the fact that carriers prefer to be "compelled" to
grant a pay raise. Any requests for rate increases must be justified before
the Civil Aeronautics Board.11 Carriers evidently feel they will present a
more convincing case if a wage raise is the result of an arbitration order
and not a voluntary settlement. The fact that practically all air arbitration
cases have involved the issue of wages is strong evidence of this.
114
The emergency board is the culmination of the Railway Labor Act's
dispute-settling mechanism; its success should be some measure of the Act's
efficacy. 115 The boards have been remarkably unsuccessful. There have
between seven airline emergency boards appointed since enactment of Title
II.116 None of the board's recommendations has ever served as the basis of
result from the use of new and faster planes. One of their arguments is that
railroad engineers have a similar mileage limit. Aviation Week, Sept. 11, 1950,
p. 46.
Since reduced operating costs are the primary incentive to mechanical im-
provements, such agreements would act as a strong deterrent to the introduction
of new planes. Thus the 'consuming public would be denied more efficient trans-
portation at lower cost. Cf. PATTERSON, SOCIAL ASPECTS OF INDUSTRY 294
(3d. ed. 1943).
110 While most airlines today show income statements in the black, net
earnings result only because the Government pays substantial subsidies. Inas-
much as these subsidies have been combined with compensation for carrying the
air mail in one lump sum payment, they cannot be measured. A recent Civil
Aeronautics Board ruling will have the effect of separating air mail pay from
subsidy after October 1, 1951. Wall Street Journal, October 2, 1951, p. 5, col. 1.
The lack of financial stability of the airlines is well-established. Congress
recently conducted a full-scale investigation "to learn why, in a period of un-
precedented prosperity, the air-line industry is in such poor financial condition."
See Berge, Subsidies and Competition in Air Transport Policy, 18 J. AIR LAw
& COMM. 1 (1951).
It is noteworthy that approximately one-half of airline operating expenses
consist of labor costs. KAHN 401.
"I Forty of the 140 arbitration cases have involved the airlines. See NMB
ANN. REPS. (1935-1950).
112 See KAHN A23-34.
118 Carriers must file all rates with the Board. Any interested party may
then complain to that body that the rates are unjust, unreasonable or discrim-
inatory. If the Board feels the complaint warrants further action, it will hold
hearings and issue an order. The Board may also begin an investigation on its
own initiative. See PUFFER, AIR TRANSPORTATION 380-8 (1941).
114 See KAHN 380.
115 Only the most difficult disputes persist to the emergency board stage.
But the emergency board provision was enacted with this fact clearly in mind.
The boards were designed to settle those quarrels which were too tough for the
Act's other techniques. See statement of Donald R. Richberg, counsel for the
organized railway employees, Hearings before Committee on Interstate and
Foreign Commerce on H.R. 7180, 69th Cong., 1st Sess. 18 (1926).
116 (1) No. 36 was appointed May 7, 1946, to investigate a dispute between
the Air Line Pilots Association and thirteen airlines over rates of pay for pilots
flying the new DC-4 and Constellation planes. The pilots demanded an entirely
new system of compensation. The airlines insisted on continuing to follow the
system established by Decision 83. See note 5 supra. The board recommended
a continuation of the method of Decision 83 but modified the pay scale to provide
somewhat increased rates at higher speeds. See Northrup, Collective Bargaining
by Airline Pilots, 61 Q. J. ECON. 533,554 (1947); KAHN 326-36.
(2) No. 38 was appointed July 3, 1946, to investigate a dispute between the
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settlement of an air labor dispute. One board, by acting in unorthodox fash-
ion as a mediator, was able to effect an agreement between the parties.
117
Another is still pending.117a In the rest of the cases, the boards' recommen-
dations were not accepted and the disputes were eventually resolved on
some other basis.818
International Association of Machinists and Northwest Airlines which grew out
of disagreements over the terms of their first collective bargaining agreement.
The board was appointed after the employees had gone on strike during con-
ciliation efforts by a mediator from the National Mediation Board. The emer-
gency board rejected many of the union demands.
(3) No. 62 was appointed May 15, 1948, to investigate a dispute between
both the Air Line Pilots Association and the International Association of
Machinists and National Airlines. The pilots' quarrel arose over one National
pilot's discharge. The IAM dispute stemmed from the inability of carrier and
union to agree on the terms of a contract covering the clerical employees. The
emergency board was not appointed until three months after the pilots went on
strike. Its appointment was precipitated by an ALPA threat to shut down all
airlines flying at all airfields served by National. The board commented on the
intransigence of the carrier and recommended the reinstatement of strikers
and further efforts to agree. The case is discussed in a Note, 16 J. AIR L. &
CoMM. 113 (1949) and KAHN 339-60.
(4) No. 67 was appointed January 24, 1949, to investigate another dispute
between the International Association of Machinists and Northwest Airlines.
This concerned rates of pay. By acting as a mediator the board was able to
bring the parties to an accord.
(5) No. 90 was appointed July 12, 1950, to investigate a dispute between
the Brotherhood of Railway Clerks and Braniff Airways over the terms of
various working rules. The Brotherhood sought to base the rules on similar
agreements in the railroad industry. The carrier asserted that they should be
patterned after the provisions in the agreements it had with other labor organi-
zations. The board saw merit in the position of both parties and made a number
of specific recommendations.
(6) No. 94 met early in 1951 to investigate a dispute between the Air Line
Pilots Association and American Airlines. Worried over the prospect of 500-mile-
per-hour jet transports in the not-too-distant future, the union is seeking again to
force a revision of the standards of Decision 83. It wants to step up hourly pay
and step down the flight mileage permitted. The result would be to maintain
pilot employment and take-hcme pay despite equipment improvement and shorter
working hours. The outcome of the controversy will undoubtedly have industry-
wide repercussions. See notes, 109 supra and 118 infra.
(7) The latest emergency board was appointed last, December to investigate
a dispute between the Transport Workers Union and Pan American World Air-
ways. Wages are the primary issue.
117 Emergency Board No. 67. See note 116 supra.
117a This the TWU-Pan American board, note 116 supra. No report had been
issued at the time this article went to press.
118 Board No. 36 was followed by a pilots' strike on one airline and pro-
tracted negotiations and arbitration. The pilots ended up with considerably
more than the emergency board thought they should have. ,
The recommendation of the second air emergency board (No. 38) were also
rejected by the union; and subsequent negotiations resulted in its attaining
somewhat more than the board had proposed.
In the National dispute the recommendations of the board (No. 62) did
help to settle disagreements with the IAM. But 'the carrier rejected the
settlement proposed with the pilots' union. A final accord was reached some
four months later independently of both the National Mediation Board and the
emergency board.
The detailed suggestions of the recent Braniff emergency board (No. 90)
were regarded by the company as ambiguous and incomplete. Subsequent nego-
tiations between the carrier and the union resulted in a working agreement which
averted a threatend strike and provided for future informal conferences to work
out the details of the rules.
Board No. 94, in the American-ALPA controversy, submitted its report on
May 25, 1951. The dispute has still not been settled. While American was the
airline nominally involved in the dispute, the controversy is in fact an industry-
wide one. The fundamental principle in contention is whether or not "mileage
increase determination" (the ALPA term-the airlines call it "mileage limita-
tion") should be imposed. The Board recommended that nothing be done at
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Several reasons may be advanced for the boards' lack of success in air
disputes. Probably most important is the fact that the emergency board is
predicated on the theory that public opinion will force acceptance of its rec-
ommendations. 119 But public opinion rarely gets very aroused over airline
labor quarrels. Moreover, during the last decade emergency boards have
completely failed in all but a few major railroad disputes. 120 The loss of
prestige which the boards have thus suffered in the railroad industry has
very likely lessened their effectiveness in air conflicts. And the tendency of
rail carriers and unions to resort to emergency boards in order to avoid a
binding arbitration has almost made a mockery of a procedure theoretically
reserved for only the most serious disagreements. 1 2 1
The over-all utility of a formalized dispute procedure such as the Railway
Labor Act provides is doubtful.122 Most deleterious to stable industrial
relations is the habit, developed by both management and labor, of going
through established routines instead of making an honest and direct effort
to agree.' 23 This proclivity is increased by the carriers' desire to grant a
this time to change the present mode of compensation, which is based on a
modification of Decision 83. The ALPA was unsatisfied with this suggestion.
On June 19, 1951, though mediation of the dispute was again in process, the
ALPA called a strike against United Airlines. The strike lasted ten days and
snarled up air transportation throughout the country. On June 29 the pilots
returned to work under a temporary truce. The matter of mileage increase
determination is still in controversy.
See AVIATION WEEK, issues during July and August, 1951; KAHN 383; com-
munications to the author; and references cited supra note 116.
119 See note 48 supra.
120 For an analysis of some of these recent railroad cases see Northrup,
The Railway Labor Act and Railway Labor Disputes in Wartime, 36 AM. ECON.
REV. 324 (1946).
So serious have recent rail disputes become and so ineffective have been the
emergency board recommendations that considerable legislative sentiment has
developed in favor of imposing some form of compulsory arbitration on the rail-
roads. A recent Senate bill to provide this went through lengthy hearings but
never reached a vote. See Hearings before Subcommittee on Railway Labor Act
Amendments of Committee on Labor and Public Welfare on S.3463, 81st Cong.,
2d. Sess. (1950). -
121 The Mediation Board has commented with disapproval on this practice.
See 16 NMB ANN. REP. 34-5 (1950).
122 Unfortunately, the Taft-Hartley Act offers no solution in this area
either; its emergency dispute procedure was largely modeled on that of the
Railway Labor Act. Under its provisions the President may appoint a board of
inquiry to investigate any threatened or actual strike which he feels imperils
the national health or safety. And he may direct the Attorney General to get an
injunction against the strike for a limited period. TAFT-HARTLEY ACT §§206-10.
Thus, as in the Railway Labor Act emergency board provisions, reliance is placed
on fact-finding and "cooling-off" periods. Most commentators have asserted that
these "cooling-off" periods more often serve as "heating up" periods. See, e.g.,
MILLER, AMERICAN LABOR AND THE GOVERNMENT 416 (1948); 1 FED. MED. &
CONCIL. SERV., ANN. REP. 56 (1949).
Probably the best thing that can be said for the Taft-Hartley emergency
procedure is that it has not been invoked with anything like the frequency of its
Railway Labor Act counterpart. For a discussion of the application of the
procedure during the first three and one-half years of the Act's operation, see
Developments in the Law-the Taft-Hartley Act, 64 HARV. L. REV. 781, 848-51
(1951).
123 Senator Morse of Oregon commented on this practice in a question ad-
dressed to Mr. D. B. Robertson, president of the Brotherhood of Locomotive
Firemen and Enginemen. "Do you agree with me that if the parties can deter-
mine in advance, from a procedure that is set up for the settlement of a labor
dispute by the Government, whether it is to their advantage to follow Govern-
ment intervention, that the party that finds it to his advantage to follow Gov-
ernment intervention is likely to sit back and let the case run its course in the
Government intervention rather than try to settle the case himself in good faith
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wage increase only under compulsion. An incidental result is that many
disputes are aggravated when breaches in prescribed formalities occur.
124
Were the parties to expend their efforts in straightforward collective bar-
gaining, satisfactory settlements would more likely result. 2 5
In its effect on resolving disagreements over matters of right, the
Railway Labor Act has little more to commend it than it has in the area
of discord over questions of interest. At least one major airline labor
dispute grew out of the inability of an adjustment board to settle a griev-
ance complaint. 126 And without a deadlock-breaking mechanism, the boards
give a delusive appearance of finality to the grievance procedure. While
the members are nominally given a free hand in decision-making, their
fundamental allegiance tends to assert itself in any major dispute. Though
the boards are the terminus of contract-interpretation disputes, their four
bipartite members thus tend to split on major issues, thereby settling
nothing.12
7
Only. a conclusive grievance-adjudication process can prevent little quar-
rels from growing into big ones. The merit of conclusive arbitration. of
such questions is evidenced by its widespread adoption by industry gen-
erally. Over eighty per cent of all existing labor contracts provide for the
compulsory arbitration of grievances.128 The recent tendency in the airlines
to provide for a fifth, neutral member in case of deadlock is therefore a
happy one. Such a provision makes the adjustment board an effective and
binding method of arbitrating grievance disputes. 129
An Evaluation of Title II
While the number of actual work stoppages in air transportation has
not been alarming, this is probably true in spite of the Railway Labor Act,
not because of it.130 A few of the Act's provisions have unquestionably
collective bargaining with his adversary?" Mr. Robertson agreed. Hearings
before Subcommittee on Railway Labor Act Amendments of Committee on Labor
and Public Welfare on S.3463, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 353 (1950).
124 The National Airlines strike, for example, was complicated by a disagree-
ment as to whether the IAM had waited the required thirty days after failure of
mediation before calling its strike. The conflict was based on two different inter-
pretations of the statutory words describing the proper procedure. RAILWAY
LABoR ACT §5 First. See Note, 16 J. AIR L. & CoMM. 113, 118-20 (1949).
125 See, e.g., statement of William Green, president of the American Federa-
tion of Labor, that "[b]y the enactment of more laws and more procedural regu-
lation governing the adjustment of the disputes the area of disputes tends to
become exaggerated and dramatized and the difficulty in reaching an agreement
enhanced. The so-called 'fact finding' procedure and its many varieties and
forms hinder rather than help the promotion of industrial peace." Hearings
before Subcommittee of Committee on Labor on General Labor Conditions, 79th
Cong., 2d Sess. 92 (1946).
126 The dispute between National and the ALPA grew out of an adjustment
board deadlock as to the propriety of a pilot discharge. See Note, 16 J. oF Am
L. & COMM. 113 (1949).
127 See KAHN 396-7.
128 See 70 Mo. LAB. REV. 160 (U.S. Bu. Lab. Statis. 1950).
129 One of the main objections to the use of a board of impartial arbitrators
is that they often make unworkable proposals. The fact that the regular
members of the adjustment boards are persons thoroughly familiar with the
practical operations of the airline makes it more likely that sensible solutions
to problems will result. Thus the system board, with provision for a neutral in
case of deadlock, is an instrument capable of realistic as well as decisive action.
Cf. Taylor, The Voluntary Arbitration of Labor Disputes, 49 MICH. L. REV. 787,
797 (1951).
180 While certainly the number of actual work stoppages is one indication
of how well an act serves its purpose, it is by no means the sole criterion. The
mere absence of strikes or lockouts does not prove that everyone is happy. And
the fact that there were few strikes in the past does not guarantee that the same
condition will prevail in the future.
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
helped settle air labor disputes. By providing some sort of framework
around 'which collective bargaining in the airlines could grow, the Act served
a useful purpose. Its enunciated aims stated an attractive ideal toward
which labor and management could strive. The conciliation experience of
the National Mediation Board probably facilitated acceptance of collective
bargaining. And a very real number of disputes have been settled under the
Act's provisions for arbitrating questions of interest.
But, in most respects, the Act's contribution to wholesome industrial
relations has been either negligible or negative. Several of its features
inhibit speedy and effective settlement of airline disputes. The Mediation
Board is bothered by numerous auxiliary functions. Its mediators are
steeped in railroad traditions. And, while the value of any formalized
dispute procedure is an open question, l '' one of the Act's most publicized
innovations, the emergency board, has been a notorious flop:
The recent turbulent labor history of the railroads has helped destroy
what little prestige the Act's formalisms may once have had. It can hardly
be expected that a procedure which has failed in the industry for which it
was tailor-made can be very effective in other industries.
But the inability of the Railway Labor Act to settle disputes is not its
most serious defect. Based on an outmoded labor philosophy, the Act
imposes excessive restrictions on individual workers and an unequal bar-
gaining position on management. Unions today are' powerful ' national
organizations-very often more than a match for their employer-adversar-
ies. But the Railway Labor Act is the product of an era of management-
dominated company organizations, when government policy was to nurture
national unions in order to equalize bargaining power. In a day of rela-
tively equal adversaries some system of proscribing unfair practices of both
unions and management is more realistic and fair.
And individual freedom of expression of both employer and employee
deserves better protection than the Railway Labor Act affords. The em-
ployer's right of free speech should be preserved. 132 The right of employees
not to join any union 133 or to act to decertify an unsatisfactory bargaining
agent 1'4 should be recognized. And employees should be given wide dis-
cretion in their choice of the appropriate bargaining unit.3 5 The Railway
Labor Act is deficient in all these aspects. Moreover, its provisions for
'determining employee representatives are carried out by an agency which
regards that function as bothersome and therefore tries to minimize it.
What few desirable features the Railway Labor Act does provide might
easily be had without, at the same time, incurring the Act's disadvantages.
Arbitration of questions of interest, which has been moderately successful
in air disputes, has been used in a number of' other industries outside
Railway Labor Act jurisdiction. In some of these it is even the standard
procedure.'l 6 And arbitration of grievances, a very desirable practice, is
not peculiar to the Railway Labor Act. The vast majority of collective
bargaining agreements contain such a provision. Finally, several agencies
1,1 Cf. notes 123 and 125 supra; Taylor, The Voluntary Arbitration of Labor
Disputes, 49 MICH. L. REv. 787,.803 (1951).
182 Cf. TAFT-HARTLEY ACT §8(c).
23s. The Taft-Hartley Act specifically recognizes this right. It is subject; of
course, to the provisions of any valid union shop agreement. Id. at §7.
184 Cf. Id. at §9 (c) (1) (A).
185 Cf. note 71 supra.
'136 This is true, for example, in the full-fashioned hosiery and printing
industries. Cf. KENNEDY, EFFECTIVE LABOR ARBITRATION: THE IMPARTIAL CHAIR-
MANSHIP OF THE FULL-FASHIONED HOSIERY 'INDUSTRY (1948); 5 L.A. 16 (1946).
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provide expert mediators who are not handicapped by auxiliary duties or a
background of experience in a unique industry.
137
Conclusion
Clearly, many of the Railway Labor Act features which are detrimental
to healthy collective bargaining in the airlines are equally inappropriate
for the railroads. And the desirability of any specialized labor legislation
is dubious. But individual legislative treatment of the railroads is so estab-
lished a precedent that realism compels its acceptance. Even in the fields of
social security and corporate reorganization, the rail industry has received
the special attention of Congress. 188 Moreover, the major railroad unions,
a dominant political influence, are strongly in favor of their specialized
treatment.
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The airlines, however, suffer far more than the railroads under the
inequities of the Railway Labor Act. For they are compelled to operate
under a special law designed for a completely different industry. The statute
in its present form was largely drafted by the national rail unions. Its
administration is characterized by an orientation toward the peculiar prob-
lems of the railroad industry. And this is only to be expected, since airline
employees constitute barely six per cent of the workers under the Act's
jurisdiction. In a. set-up historically and numerically so dominated by
railroad interests,, airline labor policy is in the position of "a very small
tail being wagged by a very large dog." 140
Perhaps the solution to air labor problems is the formulation of a special
labor law for the airlines incorporating the best features of all existing
legislation and geared to the peculiar characteristics of the industry.141
But such a proposal is patently unrealistic. The airlines are neither so
different nor so important as to merit special labor treatment. It seems
doubtful whether any industry is.
Perhaps inclusion of the airlines under the Taft-Hartley Act is the
best alternative. For the policies and provisions of that act better ensure
both individual freedom and equal bargaining power.142 And, most impor-
tant, it was not designed and is not administered under the influence of a
particular industry.
137 E.g., the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service set up under the
Taft-Hartley Act. TAFT-HARTLEY ACT §202.
1Hs See, e.g., Bankruptcy Act §77, 30 STAT. 545 (1898), as amended, 11 U.S.C.
§205 (1946); Railroad Retirement Act, 45 U.S.C. c. 9 (1946); Railroad Unem-
ployment Insurance Act, 45 U.S.C. c. 11 (1946); Federal Employers' Liability
Act, 45 U.S.C. c. 2 (1946).
89 The rail unions themselves have probably been the most active proponent
of specialized railroad legislation. For a brief account of some of their activities
and accomplishments, see Northrup; Industrial Relations on the Railroads, in
LABOR IN POSTWAR AMERICA 449, 454-7 (Warne ed. 1949); Wolf, Railroads, in
How COLLECTIVE BARGAINING WORKS 318, 364-73 (Twentieth Century Fund ed.
1945). -
. 140 Statement of Robert Ramspeck, executive vice president, Air Transport
Association of America, Hearings before Subcommittee of Committee on Labor
and 'Public Welfare on S.3295, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 218 (1950).
141 Any change of the labor law governing the airlines would necessitate
minor amendment to the Civil Aeronautics Act. 52 STAT. 977 (1938), 49 U.S.C.
§401 (1946). Section 401(1) (4) of this Act requires-air carrier compliance with
the Railway Labor Act as a condition of holding certificates of public convenience
and necessity.
142 See, e.g., notes 71, 80 and 88 supra.
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But, while the Taft-Hartley Act looks good on paper, it has raised scores
of new problems in interpretation and application. 14  Indiscriminate
prescription of the Act therefore seems inadvisable. Its imposition on the
airline industry might, while removing Railway Labor Act inequities,
introduce a myriad of unforeseen difficulties.
To determine what the best solution may be, immediate legislative
examination of the problem seems imperative. The airlines should not suffer
under an outmoded labor act whose operation is dominated by a rival in-
dustry. Nothing but inertia justifies the continued application of the
Railway Labor Act to air transportation.
JAMES B. FRANKEL*
DIGEST OF RECENT CASES
RAILWAY LABOR ACT - NATIONAL MEDIATION BOARD
JURISDICTION
Air Line Dispatchers' Association v. National Mediation Board,
189 F. 2d 685 (D.C. Cir. May 17, 1951)
The Air Line Dispatchers' Association, a labor organization filed with the
National Mediation Board under the Railway Labor Act an application for
an investigation of an alleged representation dispute among the flight dis-
patchers of Pan-American-Grace Airways, Inc. The airline company oper-
ates and the dispatchers are employed solely outside the continental limits
of the United States. The Board ruled that it had no jurisdiction and dis-
missed the application. The association then sought review of the Board's
action in the district court. The court dismissed, ruling that the Board's
decision was .not subject to judicial review.
The circuit court held that judicial review of the Board's action was
permitted under the Administrative Procedure Act where no Federal statute
expressly precludes such review. However, the circuit court held that the
Board's action in dismissing the complaint was correct because the scope of
the Railway Labor Act, in its application to air transport, could not be ex-
tended beyond the limits of railway coverage which is limited to common
carriers engaged in interstate and foreign transportation but only insofar
as such transportation takes place within the United States.
CONTRACTS - CAB JURISDICTION
Lichten v. Eastern Airlines, 189 F. 2d 939 (2nd Cir.. 1951)
Where an air carrier's tariff contained a provision exempting it from
liability for any loss or damage to baggage regardless of negligence, it was
held that this provision was valid, unless expressly disapproved of by the
CAB; that the plaintiff was unable to recover the value of jewelry lost while
she was a passenger on one of the air carrier's planes; and that the only
remedy would be before the CAB which has exclusive primary jurisdiction
over all matters regarding air carriers' tariffs.
PRIVATE AIRPORT - NUISANCE
Anderson Et. Al. v. Sauza Et. Al., Cal. 232 P. (2d)- 274, June 1, 1951
The lower court had found that the operation of a private airport was a
nuisance to adjacent property owners by reason of the noise and low flights
143 See, e.g., MILLIS & BROWN, FROM THE WAGNER ACT TO TAFT-HARTLEY
(1950). In the course of an analysis of the history and operation of the Taft-
Hartley Act the authors bring out numerous instances in which the Act has led
to knotty problems.
* Member of the third year class and Assistant in Instruction, Yale Law
School; Case Editor, YALE LAW JOURNAL; U.S. Naval Academy, B.S., 1945.
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of the airplanes and had decreed a permanent injunction completely forbid-
dig the operation of the airport. The Appellate Court reversed, holding that
an airport is not a nuisance per se and it had not been shown that the im-
position of appropriate rules and limitations would still not make it possible
for the airport to be operated in a normal and useful manner.
ANTI-TRUST - CAB - COMPETITIVE PRACTICES
S.S.W. v. Air Transport Association, July 12 - F. 2nd. - (D.C. Cir. 1951)
An irregular air carrier brought suit under anti-trust laws against cer-
tain regularly certified air-carriers charging that the regular air carriers
monopolized air commerce and suppressed competition. The district court
had dismissed the action on the ground that the CAB had exclusive juris-
diction over competitive practices and therefore over alleged violations.
The circuit court held that although the CAB does have primary jurisdiction
to determine violations of competitive practices, the Board has no authority
to award damages. Therefore the case should not have been dismissed for
lack of court jurisdiction but should be held pending the Board's determi-
nation of the lawfulness of the practices of the regular air carriers under
the terms of the Civil Aeronautics Act. The District Court can then deter-
mine the damages for violation of anti-trust laws.
FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS ACT - JET TRESPASS
Gaidys Et. Al v. United States - F. Supp. - D.C. Colo. (1951)
Where property was damaged and personal injuries were incurred as a
result of the crash of an Air Force jet fighter plane, damages could not be
collected on a claim based on or general allegation of negligence. Under
the Federal Tort Claim Act, however, action may be permitted for a "wrong-
ful act" and includes a wrong by trespass. The court held that the flight and
crash of the plane did constitute trespass, and furthermore, that the taking
off of a jet plane over a residential area in the present stage of jet aviation
development is an extra hazardous activity.
INTERVENORS - JUDICIAL REVIEW
Western Air Lines Inc. v. Civil Aeronautics Board
F. 2nd. - (9th Cir. 1951)
A party to a proceeding before the CAB is also entitled to be a party
to and to intervene in a judicial review of the Board's proceedings. How-
ever, there is no rule of procedure that necessarily entitles persons who are
permitted to intervene in Board meetings to be recognized as a party to ajudicial review of such proceedings. In addition, intervenors are not entit-
led to petition for judicial review.
MANUFACTURERS' LIABILITY - OPERATORS' LIABILITY
De Vito v. United Air Lines - 98 F. Supp. 88 (E.D. N.Y. 1951)
The Douglas Aircraft Company and United Airlines were held equally
liable for the death of a passenger in an airplane crash. The fact that
hazardous carbon dioxide concentration in the cockpit, which caused the
pilots to lose control of the plane resulted from negligence by the manu-
facturer, was held not to lessen the duty the air carrier owed to its passen-
gers to use the greatest care in operation of its planes. However, Douglas
was also held liable on the ground that its instructions to the pilots as to
emergency procedures were inadequate and the tests made with respect to
changes in the airplane design were improper.
TAXATION - GASOLINE SALES TAX
Chicago and Southern Air Lines Inc. v. Evans, Tenn. 240 S.W. 2d 249 (1951)
The state legislature passed an act exempting aviation gasoline from
taxation with the intent of relieving aviation gasoline dealers of the burden
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of paying seven cents privilege tax to maintain state highways. However,
a later act subjecting aviation gasoline to the two per cent sales tax was
valid. The court ruled that the first act could be properly amended by im-
plication of another act and that it was not the legislative intent to exempt
aviation gasoline from all future taxation.
ANTI-TRUST - CIVIL AERONAUTICS ACT
Slick Airways Inc. v. American Airlines, Inc. -
F. Supp. - (D.C. N.J. 1951)
An air carrier alleging violations of anti-trust laws by certain air freight
carriers and seeking treble damages and injunctive relief is entitled to im-
mediate relief in the courts. A conspiracy to drive a competitor out of busi-
ness is not the type of agreement encompassed within the Civil Aeronautics
Act and is not subject to the primary jurisdiction of the CAB for approval
or disapproval or for consideration of immunity from anti-trust laws. It
'is not necessary for the air carrier first to prove before the Board a con-
spiracy ,to restrain trade before seeking treble damage relief in the courts.
The Civil Aeornautics Act provides no remedy in damages for wrongs
equivalent to violations of anti-trust laws and it was not the intent of the
Civil Aeronautics Act to leave a party completely without remedy in dam-
ages.
CONTRACT AIR CARRIER-LIABILITY FOR BREACH OF CONTRACT
Phalanx Air Freight, Inc. V. National Skyway Freight Corporation
-Cal. - 232 P 2d 510, (June 15, 1951)
Defendant, authorized to operate only as a contract carrier entered into
a contract by which plaintiff, a regular air carrier, would arrange with in-
dividual shippers for a shipment by air of less than plane-load lots and after
combining such individual shipments into plane-load lots forwarded them
by defendant's planes. In an action for breach of this contract the court
held that a provision for termination after notice for a fixed period does
not render the contract illusory. The court also found that the contract
which contains a provision for monthly re-negotiation of rate and volume
quantities does not become unenforceable on failure to re-negotiate since
only one contract was entered into by the parties, not a series of month
to month contracts.
AIR TRANSPORTATION CONTRACT-INTERRUPTION OF JOURNEY
Hohensee V. Colonial Airlines, Inc.
-Pa. Ct. of Common Pleas, (October 2, i950)
The journey of an air carrier passenger was interrupted when a con-
necting carrier refused to permit him to board a plane since his seat had
been erroneously sold to another person. The passenger brought suit to
recover business loss resulting from the delay. The court found that the
transportation contracts made with the initial carrier and the connecting
carrier were separate; therefore, the action could not be brought on the
basis of negligent performance of a through transportation contract. The
action must be brought against the connecting carrier for non-performance
of a contract.
DEATH OF PILOT IN AIRPLANE COLLISION - COVERAGE
OF AVIATION LIABILITY POLICY
Petro Et Al V. Ohio Casualty Insurance Co.
95 F. Supp 59 (S.D. Cal. January 3, 1951)
Damages may be collected for the death of a pilot who was killed in
an airplane collision caused by the negligence of the other pilot where the
JUDICIAL
plane of the negligent pilot was covdred by an aviation liability policy. The
court found that the negligent pilot was a private certified pilot within the
meaning of the terms of the liability policy, although the plane was fur-
nished to him pursuant to a contract with the Veteran's Administration.
PILOT'S DEATH OVER THE HIGH SEAS -JURISDICTION
OF ADMIRALTY COURT
Lacey V. E. W. Wiggins Airways, Inc.
95 F. Supp. 916 (D.C. Mass. January 5, 1951)
The Death on the High Seas Act, which confers right of action for
wrongful death occurring on the high seas at any point beyond a marine
league from the shore of any state, is applicable to the death of an airplane
pilot, who was killed when his plane went down in Massachusetts Bay. Al-
though the wrongful act, the alleged negligent inspection of the plane which
resulted in the accident occurred on land, the court found that the wrongful
act was consummated over the high seas and, therefore, the action comes
under the jurisdiction of the admiralty court.
WRONGFUL DEATH ACTIONS - STATE STATUTE EXCLUDING
FOREIGN WRONGFUL DEATH ACTIONS
First National Bank of Chicago V. United Airlines, Inc.
190 F. 2d 493 (7th Cir. July 5, 1951)
A wrongful death action, which was_ brought in Illinois courts to recover
damages for the death of a passenger on an air carrier which crashed in
Utah, was aismissed for lack of jurisdiction. On appeal, the court found
that the Illinois statute, which excludes all foreign death actions capable
of being prosecuted to judgment in the courts of the state where death
occurred, is valid legislation.
PILOT'S CONTRACT OF EMPLOYMENT -ADJUSTMENT IN PAY
FOR FLYING HEAVIER AIRCRAFT -RETROACTIVE PAY DISPUTE
Western Airlines, Inc. V. Hollenbeck
-Colo. - 235 P. 2d 792 (August 6, 1951)
A dispute over the amount of retroactive pay due an air carrier pilot
for flying aircraft heavier than those in use by the carrier at the time of
his employment was settled in favor of the pilot. The court found that a
contract negotiated by Airline Pilot's Association takes precedent over an
earlier recommendation by a presidential Emergency Board as to rates of
pay. Furthermore, a bulletin posted by the carrier relating to retroactive
pay and signed by the pilots does not have the effect of revoking or super-
seding the pilots' contract of employment; and acceptance by the pilot of
a check for retroactive pay according to rates recommended by the Emer-
gency Board does not mean that the pilot is accepting it in full payment of
his rights and claims.
AIRPLANE CRASH AT COUNTY AIRPORT -NEGLIGENCE
- LIABILITY OF COUNTY
Miller Et Al V. County of Contra Costa
- Cal. - 235 P 2d 76 (August 27, 1951)
A county is liable for damages for injuries sustained by a pilot and for
damages to a plane resulting from an accident at the county airport where
the accident was caused by an obstruction on the runway which had not
been called to the attention of the pilot. The court also found that the negli-
gence of the owner of the plane in failing to warn the pilot of the obstruction
was not a proximate cause of the accident since knowledge of the obstruc-
tion would not have caused the pilot to act differently in an emergency
situation.
